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ABSTRACT 
The analysis of poverty dynamics yields important insights about the 
expected effectiveness of alternative social policies on poverty reduction. This 
paper analyses the effect of spell recurrence on poverty dynamics taking into 
account multiple poverty and non-poverty spells by spell order. Using data for 
Spain during a seven year period, we obtain that the poverty exit and re-entry 
rates vary not only with personal or household characteristics but also with spell 
accumulation and with the duration of past spells. Results indicate that the effect 
of duration dependence is significant and turns out to be different by spell order. 
 
Keywords: poverty dynamics, hazard models, multiple states, multiple spells, 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
JEL Classification: D1, D31, I32. 
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
The literature centred on the analysis of the lowest part of the income 
distribution has produced a large amount of work on the dynamics of poverty in 
recent years. A first interesting result of this research is the proposal of a new 
dimension in the measurement of poverty which refers to the time individuals 
spend below the poverty line. Certainly, in the analysis of poverty it is of great 
interest to be able to characterise the complete low income pattern of 
individuals along time. 
The advantage of distinguishing the characteristics of individuals that suffer 
from persistent poverty in contrast with those that experience poverty for a 
relatively short time, is that different policies may be designed in fighting against 
each of these situations. Fighting against long-term or persistent poverty will 
imply designing educational and health policies for poor children and offering 
stable complementary monetary transfers for poor adults. In contrast, transitory 
poverty could benefit from short-term labour market policies promoting 
employment stability and some short-period money transfers working as 
income substitutes. For this second group, we believe that it certainly becomes 
important to investigate the relevance of poverty spell recurrence and, most 
importantly, to measure to what extent the probability of leaving a poverty spell 
depends on having had a previous experience in poverty with a varied length. 
The relevance of distinguishing recurrence within the transitory poor becomes 
particularly evident after one of the key findings of the OECD (2001) report: 
“…the typical year spent in poverty is lived by persons who experience multiple 
years of poverty and whose long-term incomes are below the poverty threshold 
on average, even though their yearly income may periodically exceed the 
poverty threshold” (Chapter 2, 1st page). 
The literature on poverty dynamics has largely focussed on the analysis of 
spells and the estimation of entry and re-entry hazards after the seminal works 
of Allison (1982) and Bane and Ellwood (1986) which have recently been 
fostered by Stevens (1999), Devicienti (2001) or Biewen (2006). These papers 
study the extent and composition of chronic poverty in a variety of countries 
using a hazard rate approach that accounts for multiple spells of poverty and 
incorporates spell duration, individual and household characteristics and 
unobserved heterogeneity. In general, previous hazard rate approaches assume 
that the consideration of individual unobserved heterogeneity captures the 
correlation across individual spells and thus identifies various types of individuals 
in the sample through a joint distribution of individual specific effects with 
respect to spells of poverty and non-poverty. This assumption imposes the 
estimation of a single exit and re-entry hazard rate for each individual 
independent of the number of poverty spells previously experienced. In 
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contrast, our approach stems from believing that the complete individual poverty 
history may play a relevant role, in itself, in determining the likelihood of 
experiencing a new poverty or non-poverty spell. Therefore, predicted exit and 
re-entry hazards should incorporate the information on both the duration and the 
accumulation of spells. In fact, it could be the case that the relative importance of 
unobserved characteristics in determining poverty exit and re-entry hazard rates 
may, in part, hide a genuine spell accumulation effect that can be distinguished if 
we allow poverty exit and re-entry hazards to vary as spells accumulate. 
Even if this particular issue is virtually unexplored in the literature on the 
dynamics of poverty and social exclusion, the type of analysis proposed has been 
commonly utilized since long ago in a variety of other subjects. For example, 
demography researchers use these methods for the analysis of the life cycle 
fertility in order to know if the age of the marriage, the occurrence of births 
inside or outside the marriage, the age of first birth and the durations of 
previous birth intervals significantly affect the timing of subsequent births over 
the life cycle, see Heckman et al. (1985) and Heckman and Walker (1990). In 
marketing, it is often used to analyse the purchase timing and brand switching 
decisions of households for a frequently purchased product in order to check if 
the price, feature advertisements, special displays and household specific 
characteristics affect the probability of buying products in the future - see Jain 
and Vilcassim (1991) and Vilcassim and Jain (1991). Furthermore, within the 
literature on labour economics there is now already an important number of 
papers devoted to the analysis of recurrent unemployment and its effects on the 
individual’s probability of leaving unemployment in a forthcoming spell i.e. the 
relevance of unemployment history on a current unemployment spell. These 
models were introduced by Lancaster (1979, 1990) and are popular because 
they easily incorporate censored spells and variables that change over time 
while they also allow one to examine how the probability of leaving poverty 
changes with spell duration and when spells accumulate - see Heckman and 
Borjas (1980), Trivedi and Alexander (1989), Bonnal et al. (1997), Omori 
(1997), Roed et al. (1999) or Arranz and Muro (2001, 2004). 
Following these approaches we tackle the complete analysis of the influence of 
poverty history on exit and re-entry hazards in Spain by estimating hazard rates 
that consider all the information available on the individual poverty situation using 
the European Community Household Panel dataset (hereinafter, ECHP) for the 
period 1994-2000. Our methodology is in line with event history analysis given 
that we estimate a mixed proportional hazard model with multiple states and 
multiple spells that allows for lagged duration dependence explanatory variables1. 
                                          
1  Multiple spells may occur because there are multiple observations of the same kind while 
multiple states occur because individuals may experience poverty or non-poverty at any 
interview moment. 
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The case of Spain is of particular interest for the measurement of poverty 
recurrence given that this country registers a relatively large percentage of 
individuals who suffer from transitory poverty (see OECD, 2001) in comparison 
with other developed countries. In particular, if one focuses on the working-age 
population, Spain stands out as the European country with one of the highest 
levels of short-term poverty (poor at least once in three years) with figures that 
are even slightly over those observed in the US and Canada. 
Thus, our paper contributes to the literature on poverty dynamics in several 
ways: First, we aim to contribute to the debate on the determinants of the 
probability of leaving poverty by trying to disaggregate the distinct effects of 
unobserved heterogeneity and duration dependence. Secondly, our approach 
allows for different poverty exit, entry and re-entry hazards when spells 
accumulate, challenging previous studies based on poverty persistence that 
estimate one exit and one re-entry hazard rate independent of the number and 
duration of individual poverty experiences. Thirdly, since omitting the left-
truncated spells would lead to serious selection bias (see Iceland 1997) our work 
takes the option of running a model with and without left-censored data and 
comparing their results. This strategy allows us discuss the substantive differences 
in results when analysing exit hazard rates for individuals with left-censored first-
spells (for whom the poverty spell is in progress) compared to individuals who 
are new entrants to poverty. Finally, the use of time-varying covariates within 
each spell in the estimation of the exit and re-entry hazards, allows us to aim for 
the best possible fit of the individual’s complete poverty experience. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the most important 
previous results in the literature on the analysis of poverty dynamics in general 
and poverty outflow in particular. In Section 3, we describe the longitudinal data 
set used, detailing the definition of the variables and undertaking a thorough 
descriptive analysis of the observed poverty and non-poverty spells in the Spanish 
dataset. Section 4 presents the econometric model while Section 5 discusses the 
main estimation results. Finally, we present our main findings in the conclusions. 
2.   SOME PREVIOUS APPROACHES IN THE LITERATURE 
The analysis of the dynamics of poverty was initiated in the United States 
during the eighties, mainly as a result of the availability of a mature and reliable 
longitudinal data survey: the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID), ongoing 
since 19682. In the European context it is only in the beginning of the nineties that 
                                          
2  One of the most relevant papers in this literature published in that period are Allison (1982) 
and Bane and Ellwood (1986). Other interesting papers are Hill (1981), Plotnick (1983), 
Duncan (1984) or Sawhill (1988). 
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Duncan et al. (1993) try to compare, for the first time, the duration of poverty 
in a group of countries using a variety of data sources3. Fortunately for the 
development of this literature, in 1994 the European Statistical Office decided to 
obtain accurate and comparable longitudinal data information for most countries 
in the European Union initiating the ECHP Survey which, after some years, has 
become a basic tool for the analysis of social cohesion dynamics in the European 
Union. The exploitation of this dataset, together with some nationally based 
panels available for some particular countries, has allowed a large list of 
researchers to present plausible answers to important issues related to the 
duration and persistence of poverty in Europe4. 
The development of new statistical techniques in the estimation of transition 
probabilities that take state dependence into account, as Aassve et al. (2005) note 
in their literature revision, has produced an important number of ways to 
estimate transition risks. In the first place some papers have used components of 
variance models to capture the dynamics of income using a complex error 
structure5. These models are able to predict the fraction of the population likely 
to be in poverty for different lengths of time. This methodology has the advantage 
of including all individual income information in time while avoiding the ex-ante 
definition of poverty using a binary indicator. Its main disadvantage, however, is 
that it assumes that the dynamics of the income process is identical for all 
individuals in the sample, whatever their income level. Clearly, this does not seem 
to match reality and, in fact, Stevens (1999) and Devicienti (2001) conclude that, 
in comparison with duration models, components of variance models perform 
worse in fitting observed patterns of poverty in the US and the UK respectively6. 
Some other recent approximations to the estimation of outflow hazard rates 
propose the estimation of Markovian transition models (first order Markov) 
taking simultaneously into account that individuals are not randomly distributed 
either within the poor at first interview (initial conditions problem) or within the 
effectively observed at second interview (attrition problem) - see Cappellari and 
Jenkins (2004). In some sense, this type of approach focuses on sample 
heterogeneity and avoids assigning relevance to spell duration or persistence in 
                                          
3  This is first the paper on poverty dynamics in Europe that we know of, authors compare 
the duration of poverty in Germany, Sweden, The Netherlands and Luxembourg and in the 
Lorena region (France). 
4  Examples of these are Jarvis and Jenkins (1996), Cantó (1998), Antolín et al. (1999), Jenkins 
and Rigg (2001), Devicienti (2001), Aassve et al. (2005), Biewen (2006) or Cantó et al. (2007). 
These papers use information on the ECHP or the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) 
for the U.K., the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) for Germany or the Encuesta 
Continua de Presupuestos Familiares (ECPF) for Spain. 
5  Examples of this approach are Lillard and Willis (1978), Stevens (1999) and Devicienti (2001). 
6  However, this result does not necessarily imply that these models perform worse in the 
estimation of the effects of explanatory variables on transition risk. 
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the determination of the outflow rate, which is in line with the arguments raised 
by Blumen et al. (1955) in order to explain why empirical transition matrices 
underestimate the main diagonal of the matrix thus biasing downwards any 
estimation of persistence. 
Some more recent approaches to the analysis of poverty transitions choose 
to use binary dependent variable dynamic random effects models where the 
poverty situation at moment t depends on the fact that you were poor at t-1, a 
list of covariates and some unobserved individual effect. In this case state 
dependence is summarized by the coefficient estimated for lagged poverty. In 
this way Wooldridge (2005) models the distribution of the unobserved effect 
conditional on the initial value of poverty (initial conditions) and a group of 
exogenous variables7. 
A different view on the matter was offered by Shorrocks (1976) who attributed 
the phenomenon to a violation of the first-order Markov assumption which implies 
that the extension of the Markov process, in as much as the longitudinal 
information allows us to, is the way to proceed in the accurate estimation of the 
outflow rate. In this second line of argument, a long-standing approach to model 
poverty transitions has been the use of duration models in a hazard rate framework. 
Since the main contributions to this literature due to Kalbfleisch and Prentice 
(1980), Allison (1982), Duncan (1984) or Bane and Ellwood (1986), a large list of 
papers have developed single-spell duration models based on Markov chains that 
allow for the estimation of the transition probability taking into account all the 
relevant longitudinal information offered by panel datasets. A very relevant 
contribution to the easy estimation of hazard rates as an n-Markov chain by using a 
simple logit or probit model was proposed by Jenkins (1995)8. 
                                          
7  Examples of this approach to the analysis of the dynamics of poverty appear in Biewen 
(2004), Hansen et al. (2006) and Poggi (2007). In the same line a very recent paper by 
Devicienti and Poggi (2007) analyses the dynamic relationship between two supposedly 
intimately related concepts of deprivation such as income poverty and social exclusion. In 
their paper these authors propose the use of a dynamic random-effects bivariate probit 
following the recent contribution by Stewart (2007) who generalizes Wooldridge (2005) 
proposal to the bivariate case. Interestingly, their consideration of higher order dynamics 
(second-order Markov) makes the effect of initial conditions lose strength in determining 
poverty in successive periods, which seems to underline the usefulness of the information on 
individual poverty previous to the t-1 moment. 
8  Empirical applications of this methodology selecting a poverty inflow sample of spells for 
Spanish data referred to the 1985-1995 period appear in Cantó (2002, 2003). Finnie and 
Sweetman (2003) use this methodology on administrative data to estimate exit and re-entry 
transitions for Canadian individuals not including unobserved heterogeneity but stratifying the 
sample by family status (single, couple with/without children and lone parents) and including 
events as a relevant reason for transitions occurrence. Cantó et al. (2007) use a similar 
strategy to estimate exit transitions for Spanish households distinguishing between 
households with and without children and including a large list of events as explanatory 
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However, a list of recent papers have highlighted the limitations of the use of 
single spells approaches in the fitting the observed pattern of poverty 
persistence and have proposed a new methodology that allows for the 
consideration of multiple poverty and non-poverty spells simultaneously. This 
methodology was first proposed by Stevens (1999) and then used by Devicienti 
(2001), Hansen and Wahlberg (2004) and Biewen (2006)9. These papers do not 
only consider the estimation of the probability of leaving a poverty spell but are 
able to estimate the hazard rate for multiple spells while controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity, an important source of bias for the estimated 
coefficients for duration10. However, this approach has an important disadvantage 
                                                                                                                                 
variables of the transition equation. A single-spell approach is also used by Fouarge and Layte 
(2005) who estimate the exit probability including unobserved heterogeneity in an individual 
specific error term with Gaussian distribution. Much more simple is the methodology in 
Valletta (2006) who uses a pool of transitions to estimate the probability of leaving and 
entering poverty for a sample of individuals living in working-age households including labour 
market and demographic events as explanatory variables but without considering the effect of 
duration, unobserved heterogeneity or past poverty occurrences. 
9  Devicienti (2001) adds the consideration of the initial conditions problem by adjusting the 
contribution to the exit hazard rate of those individuals who are already below the poverty 
line at first household interview. In general, in most available datasets the lack of information 
on the previous household socio-economic situation implies that most papers must either 
avoid to use left-censored observations or avoid the inclusion of duration as a explanatory 
variable. However, Devicienti (2001) reports that fitting his type of model is computationally 
too demanding for a relatively short panel dataset of eight years like the ECHP. Hansen and 
Wahlberg (2004) use this same approach for data from Swedish administrative records which 
imply no attrition and a most accurate income measurement. Biewen (2006) shows how 
correct standard errors (not affected by the correlation between individuals from the same 
household) can be computed for the hazard rate model by taking into account clustering of 
observations at the household level. These standard errors are relevant in order to construct 
confidence intervals to compare the hazard rate with the components-of-variance approach. 
Other recent papers as Fertig and Tamm (2007) have followed a similar methodology to that 
of Devicienti (2001) including Biewen’s correct standard errors. These authors analyse the 
duration of child poverty in Germany trying to contribute to the literature by reducing the 
effect of left-censored spells on results. In order to do so they select a sample of newly born 
children. However, the problem these authors face is that left-censoring in poverty is a 
household matter and not an individual specific problem so their strategy, in our point of 
view, is hardly able to improve our research knowledge of how results would change if we 
could use a genuine non-left-censored spells sample. 
10  These approaches recognise explicitly the existence of two processes that can generate 
persistence: unobserved heterogeneity and true state dependence. In the first process, 
individuals could be heterogeneous with respect to characteristics that reduce their 
probability of leaving poverty (think for example that some unobserved persistent individual 
characteristic reduces the probability that the individual experiences a positive event between 
t-1 and t, i.e. being lazy, being an alcoholic or drug consumer, etc.). In the second process, 
experiencing poverty in a specific time period, in itself, increases the probability of undergoing 
poverty in subsequent periods. 
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in order to study recurrence given that it only allows for the estimation of a 
single exit and re-entry hazard rate independent of the number of poverty 
experiences that the individual may have accumulated in time. This means that, 
virtually, the recurrence of poverty spells is assumed not to affect the estimated 
probability of transition. 
The analysis presented here tries to improve our knowledge on to what 
extent the accumulation of poverty spells and the individual poverty history 
(lagged poverty and non-poverty durations) has a relevant role in determining 
future poverty risks within a duration model framework. Therefore, we aim to 
relax the assumption on the independence of the recurrent poverty experiences 
while controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and allowing for the inclusion of 
time-varying covariates11. 
We examine the persistence of poverty during a seven year period using data 
for Spain from 1994 to 2000 estimating by various hazard exit and re-entry rates 
jointly by spell order while including lagged spell durations as explanatory variables. 
In order to check the robustness of our main results, we replicate all relevant 
calculations for a sample of new-entrants to poverty thus restricting the analysis to 
individuals who are observed to become poor within the observation window12. 
3.   THE ECHP DATA SET 
3.1.   A short description of the ECHP data set 
The dataset we use is constructed using the information for Spain from the 
European Community Household Panel (hereinafter, ECHP) for the period 
                                          
11  An alternative methodology that tries to account for the way in which past poverty can 
have an effect on future poverty and thus aims to relax the assumption on the independence 
of the recurrent poverty experiences has been developed by Biewen (2004). This paper is 
related to the attempts to model poverty transitions in a more structural way initially 
proposed by Burgess and Propper (1998) and recently simplified by Aassve et al. (2005). 
These approaches propose a comprehensive model of poverty dynamics by modelling 
demographic and employment processes that underlie the poverty outcome. The main 
problem these models face is the need to simplify the large number of simultaneous risks for 
each household member given the limited number of equations and parameters one can 
identify. Further, a series of assumptions are to be made in terms of the fertility and 
employment process and this becomes most difficult in socioeconomic contexts where these 
processes and their income effects are largely unexplored. 
12  Checking the robustness of results in this way is referred to as particularly convenient in 
Iceland (1997). The author refers to the fact that, even if this does not solve the problem of 
left-truncation it sheds light on the issues of interest. Moffitt and Rendall (1993) also run a 
model with and without left-censored data in their study on lifetime distribution of female 
headship in the U.S. and discuss the substantive differences in the results. 
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1994-2001. The dataset used was designed by Eurostat in order to obtain 
country-comparable statistics on many demographic and socio-economic 
aspects of the European population related to labour market issues, income, 
living standards, education, employment and not employment-related 
satisfaction, health and migration, among others. The ECHP collects information 
about individual age, sex, education, income and labour market status together 
with an important amount of family composition variables. 
The ECHP is annually based and has a longitudinal structure that allows 
following individuals during eight years, unless they voluntarily leave the survey 
earlier. Most of the variables included in the survey describe the individual's and 
household’s situation at the moment of the interview (1994 along to 2001) or 
refer to information on the current month. However, the information on annual 
individual income from a variety of sources refers to that obtained by the 
individual during the year previous to the interview. Thus, in the construction of 
the relevant income variable to determine the individual situation of poverty in a 
given year we believe that it is important to make demographic and income 
information contemporaneous, especially if we wish to include time-varying 
covariates or events as explanatory variables of poverty flows. This means that 
we have to drop the information on incomes for 1993 (declared in 1994) and on 
characteristics for 2001 which implies that we finally use the information from 
seven complete waves instead of eight. The advantage of this procedure is that 
the definition of poor is based on contemporaneous information on incomes and 
needs which becomes crucial when we aim to correctly measure the effect of 
demographic or socioeconomic events on the individual’s probability of 
experiencing a transition. 
3.2.   Sample selection and descriptive analysis 
The period of observation in our study is from 1994 to 2000 and our sample 
includes individuals with a complete interview in the survey and whose 
household reports previous year income information13. As noted earlier, our 
sample reduces slightly when we match demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics with yearly income so that we have contemporaneous 
information on both. Thus, our sample includes 19,044 individuals of which 
15,042 (79 percent) are adults and 4,002 (21 percent) are children below 16 
years of age (see table A2)14. 
                                          
13  We eliminate between a 1 and 2 percent of individuals due to the lack of complete 
interview – see table A1. 
14  It is important to note here that given that individuals change households by creating a new 
one between two consecutive interviews (emancipation, divorce or separation), we must 
make some adjustments to household income so that individuals that change household 
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For the purposes of our research, we use the standard definition of poverty, thus 
an individual is poor if total household income of the household he or she lives in is 
less than 60 per cent of the contemporary household median income. The results on 
static poverty for this sample are reported in figure 1 showing that individual adult 
poverty rates in Spain were quite stable during the period under study. 
Figure 1 
RELATIVE INDIVIDUAL POVERTY INCIDENCE SPAIN 
ECHP 1994-2001, using contemporaneous income 
 
Note:   These results are obtained using the ECHP using contemporary income and 
characteristics and a modified OECD scale. Calculations are made for individuals weighted by 
their population weight each particular year. 
 
Regarding the particular characteristics of poverty dynamics in Spain, and 
limiting our sample to those individuals that are observed at all interviews, Table 
1 provides a variety of measures of chronic, transitory and recurrent poverty in 
order to contrast our results with those in Valletta (2006) or OECD (2001). In 
particular, the OECD (2001) chapter on poverty dynamics calculates that the 
always poor in Spain were 8.3 per cent of the sample in the first three years of 
data available from the ECHP, one of the highest percentages in the European 
Union context. Only Greece, Italy and Portugal register a larger percentage 
while Denmark registers the lowest percentage with a 2.6 percent. Thus, the 
characteristics of poverty duration in Spain are reported there to be significantly 
                                                                                                                                 
effectively contribute to the income of the household where they were when household 
characteristics were observed. Clearly, with attrition, this strategy implies that we lose 
information on some individuals and our sample reduces. Indeed, our final sample reduces 
between a 9 to 14 percent with respect to a non-contemporaneous sample depending on the 
year considered – see table A2. 
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different for individuals living within working-age households compared to the 
rest. Our results, using the complete ECHP data period, confirm this result. 
Table 1 reports that the mean annual poverty rate in Spain is significantly 
higher for households whose head is below 64 years of age than otherwise. In 
terms of dynamics, results show also that working-age households in Spain suffer a 
similar level of chronic poverty compared to the rest but a significantly higher level 
of transitory poverty15. In particular, while having one poverty spell takes place 
with a similar probability in both population groups, having two, three or more 
spells happens much more often to those individuals in working-age households 
than to the rest. Thus, recurrent poverty in Spain seems to be linked to working-
age households whose main members are active in the labour market. 
Table 1 
POVERTY DYNAMICS IN SPAIN: SOME DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS. 
ECHP 1994-2000. Balanced Panel. (weighted for attrition) 
Working-age 
households 
Non-working age 
households 
 
95% confidence 
interval value 
95% confidence 
interval 
 
value min max value min max 
Static poverty:       
Annual poverty rate (mean of the period) 16.9 — — 13.8 — — 
Chronic versus transitory poverty:       
Never poor 51.8 50.3 53.3 60.5 57.6 63.6 
Always poor 13.0 12.6 13.4 13.3 12.6 14.1 
Poor at least once 45.2 43.7 46.6 36.1 33.4 39.2 
Poor 5 out of 7 years 11.2 10.4 12.1 18.5 17.2 19.8 
Permanent-income poverty* 15.4 — — 11.6 — — 
(Sigue) 
                                          
15  Note that this result is different depending on the indicator used. Those indicators which 
are not affected by transitory poverty, such as the “percentage of always poor”, show a 
similar level of chronic poverty in both groups. If one uses the “percentage of poor 5 waves 
out of 7” or the “poor at least once” indicators, which are contaminated by transitory 
poverty, one finds a higher level of poverty in working-age households due to the 
contribution of short-term or transitory poverty. A similar effect is captured by the 
“permanent-income poor” indicator which sums all households incomes along the period and 
calculates the percentage of households whose total income in the seven-year period is 
below the 60% median income of the total sample during the whole period. 
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(Continuación) 
Working-age 
households 
Non-working age 
households 
 
95% confidence 
interval 
value 
95% confidence 
interval 
 
value min max value min max 
Recurrent versus transitory poverty:       
One poverty spell 60.3 58.4 62.3 72.9 69.2 76.3 
Two poverty spells 33.0 31.0 34.9 23.3 20.1 26.8 
Three or more poverty spells 16.6 15.8 17.6 13.8 12.3 15.5 
One spell, left-censored 14.5 13.1 16.0 16.6 13.3 20.3 
Two spells, first left-censored 10.9 19.6 12.3 14.4 13.0 15.9 
Three or more spells, first left-censored 15.9 15.1 16.9 2.3 11.3 13.5 
First spell not left-censored 68.6 66.7 70.4 76.6 72.8 79.9 
Total number of individuals 7,992 1,830 
Note:   These results are obtained for individuals present in all seven waves of the panel. The 
definition of working-age household is that in which the head of household is 15 to 64 years 
of age as in OECD (2001), measured at first interview in the panel. In all dynamic results we 
use last interview longitudinal weights while in static poverty calculations these are multiplied 
by cross-sectional weights. Confidence intervals are obtained using bootstraps of 1000 
repetitions and are bias corrected. Permanent-income poverty is calculated as the percentage 
of the sample for who average (equivalent) income over the seven years falls below the 
poverty line over this period. 
(*)   This indicator is calculated summing up all household incomes along the period and 
calculating the percentage of households whose total income in the seven-year period is 
below the 60% median income of the total sample during the whole period. 
 
In order to construct our final sample for dynamic analysis, we select 
individuals present in the 1994 sample and in all consecutive interviews until 
either the survey ends or they suffer from attrition (they leave prior to the end of 
the survey)16. Thus individuals joining the survey after 1994 are not included in 
our sample. After this selection we have an unbalanced panel of individuals that 
we will use for a preliminary descriptive analysis of poverty incidence, poverty 
persistence and poverty transition rates using conditional probabilities calculations 
– see table 217. Results from table 2 indicate that, as in the cross-sectional sample, 
                                          
16  Note that if the individual leaves prior to the end of the survey the ongoing spell will be 
treated as right-censored. 
17  This first unbalanced sample includes 19,044 individuals (a total of 99,507 person-year 
observations) and, as it would be expected due to attrition, the sample size falls along the 
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the pattern of static poverty in our sample is quite flat: the incidence of poverty is 
pretty stable between 19-21 per cent of the households in the sample. 
Some preliminary results on transitions are also reported in table 2, these are 
obtained by calculating the conditional probability that the individual is in a certain 
situation at moment t given his/her situation in the previous year, t-1. The first 
row of these conditional probabilities indicates the individual probability of 
remaining in poverty in two consecutive interviews i.e. two-year poverty 
persistence. Some 52 per cent of individuals who were poor in 1994 continue to 
be in poverty in 1995. In subsequent waves, this conditional probability fluctuates 
only slightly from 49 per cent in 1996 to just 55 per cent in 2000. Thus, for the 
entire period, these results show that there is a considerable persistence in 
poverty, a mean of almost 53 per cent of individuals who where poor at time t-1 
are also poor one year later. As expected, transition probabilities from poor to 
non-poor are higher than from non-poor to poor but entry and exit from poverty 
do not seem to have a clear pattern along the period18. Interestingly, the 
probability of attrition does not appear to be determined by the individual 
poverty situation. Indeed, even if in 1995 and 1997 the probability of attrition was 
slightly higher for the group of the poor (approx. 12.5 versus 10.5 per cent), this 
difference is not observable at any other moment. 
Table 2 
POVERTY INCIDENCE AND SHORT-TERM PERSISTENCE. 
ECHP 1994-2000. Unbalanced Panel. (weighted for attrition) 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Mean 
1994-2000
Incidence         
Headcount index 
(% poor) 19.88 19.17 17.98 20.99 18.90 19.60 18.76 19.32 
Conditional probabilities 
Poverty short-term 
persistence 
Prob (yt=1/yt-1=1)  52.31 49.39 54.48 51.89 54.3 54.95 52.89 
Poverty entry occurs 
Prob (yt=1/yt-1=0)  17.87 17.76 10.66 17.23 18.86 18.54 18.49 
(Sigue) 
                                                                                                                                 
period. Table A3 in the appendix contains a similar analysis for the total sample from the panel 
without any selection. As one can easily check it appears that results are remarkably similar. 
18  Our results in this table match those obtained for the period 1994-1996 by the OECD 
(2001) report where using an OECD equivalent scale and a 60% of the median income 
poverty line the headcount index is 19.2, the entry rate is 8.3 and the exit rate is 39.7. 
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(Continuación) 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Mean 
1994-2000
Poverty exit occurs 
Prob (yt=0/yt-1=1)  35.17 39.22 32.91 38.23 36.27 38.62 36.74 
Persistence out of poverty 
Prob (yt=0/yt-1=0)  81.58 80.45 79.08 82.98 80.48 84.5 81.51 
Atrittion         
Prob (yt=mis/yt-1=0)  10.54 11.79 10.27 19.79 10.66 16.96 10.00 
Prob (yt=mis/yt-1=1)  12.51 11.39 12.61 19.88 19.42 16.44 10.38 
Sample Size (weighted) 19,044 16,95915,01613,85312,87111,979 11,588 19,044 
Note:   These results are obtained using the ECHP contemporary income and characteristics 
information and using a modified OECD equivalence scale. Calculations of headcound index 
are made for individuals weighted by their population weight each particular year. The sample 
here is that of all individuals present in 1994 and in consecutive interviews in the ECHP panel 
until the survey ends or they suffer from attrition. Note that yt=1 if the individual is poor in 
time t and 0 if the individual is non-poor, “mis”means that attrition occurred. 
 
Our econometric estimations of transitions rates will require individual 
consecutive observations (to allow for current and lagged poverty and re-entry 
spells) and a common date of entry to the panel - see Heckman (1981). 
Therefore, our final sample of individuals is an unbalanced panel of 3,664 
individuals who were poor in 1994 and have consecutive observations in the 
panel19. Given that the incidence, short-term persistence and recurrence 
remained quite constant across the period we believe that this sample selection 
is particularly adequate in this context (see Table 3). This choice allows us to 
use the longest observation window possible and provides us with a stock of 
3,664 individuals in poverty whose first poverty spell is, by definition, in progress 
at the start of the sample period20. This sample’s first spells are all left-censored 
poverty spells for which duration is unknown because the start date is missing. 
By definition, second, third or fourth spells are non-left-censored. However, 
some of the poverty and non-poverty spells will be right-censored because they 
                                          
19  This means that we require an individual not to have missing observations in between 
interviews to be included in this dataset. This sample amounts to a total of 19,219 person-
year observations. 
20  Note here that we cannot distinguish if the spell began precisely in 1994 or was in progress 
before the start of the sampling period. This sample doest not include individuals who started 
the ECHP and may temporarily exit the ECHP presenting missing values across several years 
(because we do not know their status of poverty and non-poverty). There are 333 individuals 
of this type who experience 1,496 poverty spells. 
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will be still in progress at the end of the ECHP time window. For the latter we 
only know that the elapsed time of the spell was longer than the interval 
between the spell start date and the end of the ECHP observation window 
(1994-2000): censored durations. Clearly, ending spell dates are only known for 
those spells that are observed to finish within the observation window21. 
This sample includes left-censored spells given that erasing left-censored 
spells in progress at the start of the sample (even if considering unobserved 
heterogeneity) provokes a form of sample selection bias as Stevens (1997) and 
Iceland (1997) indicate22. Indeed, if we select only those individuals who are 
observed to enter poverty in 1995 and follow their future movements into and 
out of poverty across the period 1994-2000 –see table A4 in the Appendix–, the 
conditional transitions from non-poor to poor obtained from this sample, are 
significantly higher than those reported for the complete sample in table 2 or 
even the first sample in table A3 (they range from 14 per cent to 32 per cent 
while those for the first sample are almost always below a 10 percent)23. 
However, we will return to this issue later in order to analyse, in detail, the 
consequences of keeping left-censored spells in the sample on our results24. 
Results on poverty incidence and persistence using our selected sample are 
reported in table 325. We observe that, in comparison with our first sample, the 
individual’s probability of stepping into poverty is now significantly higher (more 
than a double the risk of transition than our first sample in table 2: 7.8 to 8.5 
compared to 24.2 to 19.2)26. In contrast, individuals in this second sample show 
                                          
21  Note here that the duration of the spells (of poverty or non-poverty) of those individuals 
who leave prior to the end of the survey (attrition) are also considered as right censored 
observations. 
22  Note that including left-censored spells is also the choice in the descriptive analysis 
undertaken by Stevens (1999) or Jenkins and Rigg (2001). It is easy to see that if we were to 
eliminate them from the sample and only consider individuals who begin a new spell after 
1994, thus entering poverty in 1995 for the first time, we would overstate transition 
probabilities given that the selected sample would have experienced at least one transition 
(non-poor to poor) since 1994. 
23  However, note that the estimations of models ignoring unobserved heterogeneity or 
omitted variables which only include spells that begin after the start of the sample, give 
consistent estimates of poverty transition rates for the population, Heckman and Singer (1984). 
24  It is not possible for us to model the hazard rate of an individual’s first entry into poverty 
or first exit from poverty (initial conditions) because we do not have information on the pre-
1994 income histories of those who were poor (or not) before 1994. Our only control for 
left-censoring is to estimate a separate baseline hazard for left-truncated spells as Callens et al. 
(2005) suggest. 
25  In the Appendix we include a similar table for three types of individuals: those below 16 
years of age, those between 16 and 65 and those above 65 (See table A5.-A7.). 
26  This appears a reasonable effect of selecting individuals already touched by poverty in 
1994. 
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a higher persistence in poverty (53 to 68 per cent depending on the year 
compared to 49.4 to 55 percent) and thus also a lower probability leaving 
poverty at any two subsequent interviews. Also they show a lower persistence 
out of poverty which implies that they are more likely to suffer poverty recall. In 
sum, this sample includes more chronic poor but also more short-term 
recurrently poor individuals than our first sample. 
Table 3 
POVERTY INCIDENCE AND SHORT-TERM PERSISTENCE: MAXIMUM 
OBSERVATION WINDOW. ECHP 1994-2000. (weighted for attrition) 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Mean 
1994-2000
Incidence         
Headcount index 
(% poor) 100 59.98 51.35 52.94 51.36 45.58 40.39 57.37 
Conditional probabilities 
Poverty short-term 
persistence 
Prob (yt=1/yt-1=1)  53.87 60.42 65.29 68.06 58.03 61.08 61.13 
Poverty entry occurs 
Prob (yt=1/yt-1=0)   24.2 29.83 24.72 22.96 19.15 20.14 
Poverty exit occurs 
Prob (yt=0/yt-1=1)  35.94 30.64 22.93 25.36 32.99 33.03 30.15 
Persistence out of poverty 
Prob (yt=0/yt-1=0)   63.36 62.95 67.88 65.27 73.69 55.53 
Atrittion         
Prob (yt=mis/yt-1=0)   12.44 17.22 17.41 11.78 17.15 17.67 
Prob (yt=mis/yt-1=1)  10.19 18.94 11.78 16.58 18.98 15.89 18.73 
Sample Size (weighted) 3,664 3,291 2,964 2,685 2,523 2,270 2,154 3,664 
Note:   These results are obtained using the ECHP contemporary income and characteristics 
information and using a modified OECD equivalence scale. Calculations of headcound index 
are made for individuals weighted by their population weight each particular year. The sample 
here is that of all individuals present in 1994 and in consecutive interviews in the ECHP panel 
until the survey ends or they suffer from attrition. Note that yt=1 if the individual is poor in 
time t and 0 if the individual is non-poor, “mis”means that attrition occurred. 
 
Results on spell duration pooling the data for all the poverty and non-poverty 
periods without considering the order of each occurrence are reported in table 4. 
The last row of this Table reflects the long-term persistence of poverty in Spain 
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in the period under analysis: 9.4 per cent of individuals who are poor in 1994 
continue to be below the poverty line seven years later, this percentage rises to 
12 per cent for those who are able to step out of poverty for a year but come 
back to it suffering a second poverty spell of, at least, 6 years of length. We find 
that nearly 26 per cent of the individuals remain four years or more in poverty 
and 35.5 per cent of the individuals who exit poverty (thus enter a non-poverty 
period) remain one year in non-poverty, 22.5 per cent two years and 12 per 
cent at least six. 
Table 4 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF ELAPSED DURATIONS, ALL SPELLS. 
Sample restricted to individuals who are poor in 1994 and 
consecutive observation in panel ECHP 1994-2000 
all poverty spells All non-poverty spells 
Elapsed duration 
Freq % Freq % 
1 1,395 38.1 865 35.5 
2 796 21.7 549 22.5 
3 514 14.0 361 14.8 
4 277 17.6 232 19.5 
5 214 15.8 145 15.9 
6 123 13.4 288 11.8 
7 345 19.4 — — 
Total individuals 3,664 100 2,440 100 
Mean (Std. Dev.) 2.69 (1.94) 2.63 (1.70) 
 
Tables 5 and 6 focus on the frequency distribution of elapsed poverty and 
non-poverty spells by order of occurrence of the particular spell. Our findings in 
these tables highlight the importance of considering multiple spells in the 
analysis of poverty dynamics: out of the 3,664 individuals who are in poverty 
since 1994, 27 per cent have two occurrences along the time of observation and 
nearly 7.5 per cent have three or more occurrences. This implies that a 35 per 
cent of the individuals re-enter poverty during the seven year period and, out of 
these, a 21 per cent actually re-enter twice or three times. In terms of duration, 
first-spells have a mean duration of two and a half years while the duration of 
second and third poverty spells is slightly shorter (1.7 and 1.3 years 
respectively)27. 
                                          
27  This result could be affected by the seven year interview structure of the dataset. 
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales 
— 23 — 
Indeed, Table 6 shows that 47 per cent of first poverty spells have an elapsed 
duration of one year and this percentage increases up to 54 per cent if we are in a 
second occurrence and to 73 per cent in a third one, meaning that if one has a second 
or third poverty spell, these spells are likely to be particularly short, in fact they are 
most likely to be one year periods. A similar result is obtained for non-poverty spells. 
In sum, there seem to be certain groups of individuals that are particularly prone to 
exit and re-enter poverty experiencing a row of one to two year spells. 
Table 5 
NUMBER OF SPELLS OF POVERTY AND NON-POVERTY IN TOTAL SAMPLE. 
Sample restricted to individuals who are poor in 1994 and 
consecutive observation in panel ECHP 1994-2000 
Poverty Non-poverty Number of 
occurrences Freq. % Freq. % 
1 2,388 65.17 1,670 45.58 
2 1,003 27.37 678 18.5 
3 268 17.31 92 12.51 
4 5 10.14   
Total individuals 3,664 100 2,440 66.59 
Table 6 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF ELAPSED DURATIONS BY ORDER OF OCCURRENCE. 
Sample restricted to individuals who are poor in 1994 and 
consecutive observation in panel. ECHP 1994-2000 
First poverty 
spell  
First non-
poverty spell
Second 
poverty spell 
Second non-
poverty spell
Third 
poverty spell 
Third non-
poverty spellElapsed 
duration 
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % 
1 1,718 46.89 1085 44.47 691 54.15 413 53.64 201 73.63 81 88.04
2 705 19.24 461 18.89 332 26.02 225 29.22 159 21.61 11 11.96
3 389 10.62 276 11.31 146 11.44 185 11.04 113 14.76 — — 
4 205 5.59 185 17.58 172 15.64 147 16.1 — — — — 
5 179 4.89 145 15.94 135 12.74 — — — — — — 
6 123 3.36 288 11.8 — — — — — — — — 
7 345 9.42 — — — — — — — — — — 
Total 
individuals 3,664 100 2440 100 1276 100 770 100 273 100 92 100
Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
2.50 
(1.97) 
2.47 
(1.75) 
1.77 
(1.04) 
1.70 
(0.89) 
1.31 
(0.56) 
1.12 
(0.33) 
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4.   ECONOMETRIC APPROACH: A MULTI-STATE MULTI-SPELL 
4.   HAZARD MODEL 
The main aim of this paper is the estimation of the individual probability of 
leaving poverty taking account the effect across multiple spells of the current 
poverty and non-poverty duration, the occurrence of multiple-spells, the lagged 
poverty and non-poverty duration and individual and household characteristics. 
For that purpose, we use life-table analysis and estimate a multivariate multi-
state multi-spell model for the exit and re-entry hazards. 
Our strategy consists in simultaneously estimating up to four hazard rates at 
once, mirroring the individuals’ complete poverty history28. We first choose to 
examine the persistence of poverty for individuals who are poor in 1994 and 
have consecutive interviews in the panel, rather than examining the incidence of 
poverty for the entire ECHP sample. Later, we will restrict our analysis to those 
individuals who become poor in 1995 (inflow sample or sample of new entrants) 
in order to understand the relevance of left-truncation on results. 
In the hazard methodology, the probability of leaving poverty pih  (or re-
entering poverty, rih )
29 may be defined as the limit of the conditional probability 
of a transition taking place in a small interval dt  after time t  if no transition 
occurs until t , when that interval approaches to zero. The exit rate is modelled 
by means of a multiplicative separable function of three terms: the baseline exit 
hazard, the covariates and unobserved heterogeneity. 
Formally: 
 { } ipipipi0pipi0dtipipipi ')(TXexp)(Tdt t)T¦tTdttPr(lim)),t(X,T(h θβλ=≥≥>+=θ → (1) 
In this equation, subscripts i  indicate the individual and p  the period in 
poverty. The term piT  is the latent current duration of individual i´s p’th poverty 
spell, ( )t0λ  is the interval-specific baseline hazard rate, which is unknown; piX  is 
a vector of time-invariant and time-varying covariates for individual i , β  is the 
vector of unknown parameters to be estimated, and finally iθ  captures 
unobserved individual characteristics that could affect the hazard but are 
unobservable in the data, such as social exclusion problems together with 
attitudes towards claiming benefits of finding a job, motivation, inherent ability, 
and so on. 
                                          
28  We have performed our estimations in Stata 9.2. 
29  We here present the econometrics for the analysis for the probability of leaving poverty in 
order to simplify notation, however our analysis includes the estimation of both the 
probability of leaving and re-entering poverty in an analogous way. 
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Defining the probability of surviving through any interval dt  after having 
survived the preceding j  intervals as ( )pih1− , the probability of ending a spell of 
poverty in the thp  interval is given by the hazard function30: 
 [ ] )h(1htTPrh spi1t
1s
pipipi
p∏−
=
−===  (2) 
where pt  represents poverty duration. However, given that there are some poverty 
spells that continue to proceed at the end of the sample period, right censored 
spells also contribute to the likelihood. Their contribution can be expressed as31: 
 [ ] )h(1tTPr spipt
1s
pi ∏
=
−=>  (3) 
Given that we are interested in incorporating multiple spells of poverty and 
non-poverty to our analysis, our likelihood function contains several components 
that capture multiple exits from poverty to non-poverty and viceversa. In 
particular the likelihood for any observed individual i  can be expressed as: 
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Where 1ph  and 2ph  are discrete hazard rates for leaving poverty during her 
first and second poverty spell and 1rh  and 2rh  are discrete hazard rates for re-
entering poverty during the corresponding periods out of poverty in between. 
Furthermore, 1pt  and 2pt  represent poverty spell durations while 1rt  and 2rt  are 
the non-poverty spell durations once the first poverty spell ends ( 1rt  takes place 
                                          
30  We omit t, X and θ  to simplify notation. 
31  Similarly to the exit rate, the hazard rate for re-entry is given by an analogous expression 
(where “p” changes to “r”): { } iririri0iririri ')(TXexp)(T)),t(X,T(h θβλ=θ .Thus the probability of 
ending a spell of non-poverty in the hr  interval is given by: rih = [ ] )h(1htTPr sri
1tr
1s
riri ∏−
=
−== and the 
contribution to the likelihood of non-poverty spells that continue to proceed at the end of the 
sample is [ ] )h(1tTPr sri
tr
1s
ri ∏
=
−=> . 
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between the 1pt  period and just before 2pt ) or the second one finishes ( 2rt  takes 
places after 2pt ). Finally, i1d , i2d , i3d , i4d  are dummy variables that allow us to 
distinguish between censored and completed poverty and non-poverty spells. 
The first component in (4) captures the likelihood that the individual during 
her first poverty period remains in poverty all the period under study (a). The 
second and third component account for the likelihood of individuals who exit 
during their first poverty period to their first non poverty period, remaining in 
this state the rest of years (b) or re-entry again to their second poverty 
experience (c). Within these some will remain in their second poverty 
experience the rest of years (d) or they will exit to their second non-poverty 
experience (e). Finally, the last two components capture the likelihood that the 
individuals who enter a second non-poverty period remain in this state the rest 
of years (f) or exit to a new poverty experience (h)32. 
In our estimations we use a quadratic form for the baseline hazard rate as in 
Biewen (2006) given that our results from life-tables confirm the adequateness 
of this particular form of duration dependence (see also figures 2 and 3). In 
order to take unobserved heterogeneity into account, a finite-mixture 
unobserved heterogeneity distribution with unknown support points is also 
considered33. Therefore, the likelihood function for individual i is obtained by 
integrating the following conditional likelihood distribution: 
 )s()s|,(L),,,(L
S
1s
i π=θγβ=πγθβ ∏
=
 (5) 
where θ  are the location points, π  the probability associated to them, and s the 
number of support points. 
Note here that the use of current duration as an explanatory variable for 
leaving a poverty or non-poverty spell stems from the idea that it appears 
reasonable to think that there is something about the length of the period of 
time spent either in poverty or out of poverty that affects the probability of a 
                                          
32  In (4) lid  allows for making a separation between censored and uncensored durations 
during the first poverty period, taking value 1 when the individuals exit to their first non-
poverty period and 0 in the rest of cases; 2id i equals 1 when the individuals during their first 
non-poverty period exit to a second poverty period (0 in the rest of cases); i3d  allows a 
separation between censored and uncensored durations in the second poverty period, it 
takes value 1 when the individuals exit to non-poverty during the second poverty period (0 in 
the rest of cases); finally, i4d  distinguishes between censored and completed duration in the 
second non-poverty period, it takes value 1 when the individuals exit to poverty during the 
second non-poverty period (0 in the rest of cases). 
33  Heckman and Singer (1984) demonstrate that standard parametric form assumptions for 
unobserved heterogeneity might be biased when the chosen distribution for the unobservable 
term is incorrect. For this reason, they solve this problem by assuming that unobserved 
heterogeneity is discretely distributed with unknown support points. 
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household leaving or returning to this situation. This reasoning appears 
straightforward in clear-cut definitions of other possible individual states like 
unemployment, where the loss of human capital or the end of benefit reception 
while unemployed makes it reasonable to expect a different escape rate from 
unemployment as unemployment duration increases. Why would this be the 
case for the state of poverty?. 
In the case of poverty, the definition of state of poverty is not so clear-cut. 
The division between being poor or not is a thin line in the income distribution. 
Is it reasonable then to expect that the opportunities to move up in the income 
distribution for households in its lowest tail will be affected by the time they 
remain in low income? Theoretically, when a household enters poverty, 
household members would start to use up their savings in order to maintain 
their previous level of welfare. The longer the household is poor, the more 
likely the household's savings will have ended and the more likely the household 
is to suffer a welfare loss. This welfare loss may imply a loss of household 
members’ opportunities (due to the costs of undertaking them) that may bring 
the household out of poverty. These opportunities include the members' search 
for a job if unemployed, the members' investment in education that will help 
them enter the labour market in an advantageous position or the departure of 
members from the household to create a new one. Other effects on the exit 
hazard rate could be imposed by the means-testing and receipt duration schemes 
of state benefits paid to the lowest tail of the income distribution. Hence, it would 
be reasonable to think that the probability that a household jumps out of the 
lowest tail of the income distribution could be affected by poverty duration. 
A similar reasoning would apply to the probability of returning to poverty. As 
Gardiner and Hills (1999) point out, the income mobility process is not random 
and low-income escapers are more likely to drop back into the poorest than 
those who never suffered low-income. Clearly, duration out of poverty in this 
case is expected to play a similar role: the longer the time the individual is out of 
poverty, the lower the probability of returning to it. 
The study of the relationship between the duration of a poverty spell and the 
escape and re-entry rate will test this correlation in order to find out if it is 
constant in time or it changes after some duration of a poverty or non poverty 
spell. Obviously, one should note that, in the case of poverty or non-poverty, 
the difficulties in detecting this correlation and disentangling it from unobserved 
heterogeneity may be larger than for other definitions of individual or household 
states. The reason is the larger amount of events that affect the value of the 
household income and the time span needed in order to detect this correlation 
due to both the time it takes a household to use up its savings and the long-term 
nature of the effects of a household's low income period on most household 
members' labour market opportunities and correlated decisions. 
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The covariates included in our estimations will try to capture the differences 
in individual characteristics but also those related to the composition of the 
household they belong to (number of dependent children, age and education of 
the household head, number of earners in the household, etc.) and household 
members labour market attachment (whether the household head or other 
adults are in paid work, etc.). The only individual variable included is gender 
while age will probably be captured by the age of the household head.  
5.   RESULTS 
In a first approach to measuring the relevance of spell duration on the 
probability of leaving poverty we report life-table estimates of the probability of 
leaving and re-entering poverty. These results assume that the population is 
homogeneous in characteristics. We begin by analysing the whole sample of 
spells irrespective of their order and follow by distinguishing the order of each 
spell occurrence. In a second step we report results on estimations of transition 
rates using multivariate hazard regression models. This second approach to 
measuring transition risk provides a generalization of life tables estimations 
when transition rates are allowed to vary not only with the elapsed time at risk 
but also with observed and unobserved individual characteristics. 
5.1.   Life-table estimates of transition rates 
Tables 7 and 8 display the life-table estimates of hazard rates, survival 
probability and cumulative failure. Table 7 illustrates that both types of spells 
show a decline of the transition hazard as duration evolves, thus supporting the 
idea of negative duration dependence for both situations. However, some 
differences are already observable between the exit and re-entry hazards. First, 
the probability of returning to poverty is significantly lower than the probability of 
exiting from poverty. Thus, non-poverty spells, in general are of a longer duration 
than poverty spells. Secondly, the re-entry hazard continues to decline after three 
years of spell evolution while the exit hazard rate experiences a rapid decline 
during the first three years but is fairly constant from then onwards. 
Distinguishing the order of spells and thus analysing the effects of spell 
accumulation is one our main objectives. Therefore, in table 8 we include results 
on transition rates for each spell type by their order of occurrence. We can see 
that the results in table 7 are similar to those obtained for the first spell of 
poverty or non-poverty in table 8 but are clearly different from those obtained 
for the second poverty spell. This result underlines the importance of taking 
multiple spells into account and in considering the differential hazard rate 
implied by accumulation of multiple experiences in and out of poverty. 
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Regarding the results for the first poverty spell, we can see that hazard rates 
decline rapidly during the first two years of observed poverty spell duration, 
thus supporting the idea of negative duration dependence. However, the hazard 
stays fairly constant from two up to seven years duration. Indeed, some 47 per 
cent of individuals in their first poverty spell left after one year of observation in 
the panel (note here that the real spell could be much longer) while out of those 
that remain poor, just over a third 32 per cent left poverty in the following year. 
In contrast, from the third to the sixth year of observation, the exit hazard rate 
fell only by two percentage points, from 23.5 to 21.4. Combining this relative 
high hazard rates for the first poverty spell with the results on the first spell 
survival function suggests that the majority of individuals in our sample 
experience relatively short poverty spells while some minority (a fifth of the 
sample) experience relatively long spells: 62 per cent of individuals remain poor 
only during one year, 44 per cent two years, 35 per cent at least 3 years and just 
about 19 per cent seven or more years. 
Table 7 
LIFE TABLES ESTIMATES OF HAZARD RATES, SURVIVAL PROBABILITY AND 
CUMULATIVE FAILURE FOR ALL POVERTY EXITS AND RE-ENTRIES. 
Based on all poverty spells observed from ECHP waves 1994-2000 
for individuals who are poor since 1994 
Interval 
(years) 
Total number of 
individuals at risk 
Total (individuals) 
Deaths Lost 
Survival
(%) 
Cum. 
Failure 
(%) 
Std. 
Error 
Hazard 
(%) 
Std. 
Error
All exits 
1     2 5218 1900 715 60.91 39.09 0.7 48.59 1.08 
2     3 2603 718 378 42.79 57.21 0.75 34.94 1.28 
3     4 1507 323 225 32.88 67.12 0.75 26.2 1.45 
4     5 959 163 114 26.94 73.06 0.75 19.87 1.55 
5     6 682 111 103 22.2 77.8 0.74 19.3 1.82 
6     7 468 87 36 17.91 82.09 0.73 21.4 2.28 
7     8 345 0 345 17.91 82.09 0.73 0 - 
All re-entries 
1     2 3302 947 632 68.29 31.71 0.85 37.69 1.2 
2     3 1723 351 346 52.82 47.18 0.98 25.54 1.35 
3     4 1026 155 206 43.95 56.05 1.04 18.33 1.47 
4     5 665 63 169 39.18 60.82 1.09 11.48 1.44 
5     6 433 38 107 35.26 64.74 1.15 10.54 1.71 
6     7 288 0 288 35.26 64.74 1.15   
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Table 8 
LIFE TABLES ESTIMATES OF HAZARD RATES, SURVIVAL PROBABILITY AND 
CUMULATIVE FAILURE BY ORDER OF OCCURRENCE. 
Based on all poverty spells observed from ECHP waves 1994-2000 
for individuals who are poor since 1994 
Interval 
(years) 
Total number of 
individuals at risk 
Deaths Lost Survival 
(%) 
Cum. 
Failure (%)
Std. 
Error 
Hazar
d (%) 
Std. 
Error
First poverty spell (1) 
1     2 3664 1326 392 61.76 38.24 0.83 47.27 1.26 
2     3 1946 1519 186 44.47 55.53 0.88 32.57 1.41 
3     4 1241 1246 143 35.11 64.89 0.87 23.51 1.49 
4     5 1852 1151 154 28.69 71.31 0.85 20.15 1.63 
5     6 1647 1111 168 23.49 76.51 0.83 19.91 1.88 
6     7 1468 1187 136 18.95 81.05 0.81 21.41 2.28 
7     8 1345 1110 345 18.95 81.05 0.81 0 — 
First non-poverty spell (2) 
1     2 2440 736 349 67.51 32.49 0.98 38.79 1.41 
2     3 1355 295 166 51.86 48.14 1.11 26.23 1.51 
3     4 1894 144 132 42.84 57.16 1.14 19.05 1.58 
4     5 1618 163 122 37.99 62.01 1.16 11.99 1.51 
5     6 1433 138 107 34.19 65.81 1.21 10.54 1.71 
6     7 1288 110 288 34.19 65.81 1.21   
Second poverty spell (3) 
1     2 1276 491 200 58.25 41.75 1.44 52.77 2.31 
2     3 1585 190 142 36.72 63.28 1.54 45.35 3.21 
3     4 1253 177 169 23.78 76.22 1.55 42.78 4.76 
4     5 1107 112 160 20.07 79.93 1.64 16.91 4.86 
5     6 1135 110 135 20.07 79.93 1.64   
Second non-poverty spell (4) 
1     2 770 206 207 69.09 30.91 1.79 36.56 2.51 
2     3 357 156 169 54.89 45.11 2.21 22.91 3.04 
3     4 132 111 174 48.54 51.46 2.66 12.29 3.71 
4     5 147 110 147 48.54 51.46 2.66   
(Sigue) 
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(Continuación) 
Interval 
(years) 
Total number of 
individuals at risk 
Deaths Lost Survival 
(%) 
Cum. 
Failure (%)
Std. 
Error 
Hazar
d (%) 
Std. 
Error
Third poverty spell (5) 
1     2 273 83 118 61.21 38.79 3.33 48.12 5.13 
2     3 172 19 150 49.49 50.51 4.43 21.18 7.02 
3     4 113 10 113 49.49 50.51 4.43   
Third non-poverty spell (6) 
1     2 92 5 76 90.74 9.26 3.94 9.71 4.34 
2     3 11 0 11 90.74 9.26 3.94   
Fourth poverty spell (7) 
1     2 5 0 5 100 0 0   
 
The interesting question we pose is: Do these conclusions differ for those 
individuals that experience a second occurrence in poverty (after having 
experienced a period of non-poverty)? We observe that the probability that an 
individual leaves poverty when experiencing a second occurrence is significantly 
higher than it was during his/her first poverty spell. Indeed, during the first year 
the hazard rate in the second poverty period is 5.5 percentage points higher 
than in the first one. Interestingly this difference increases up to a 14 and 19 per 
cent more during the second and third year. Therefore, we find evidence that 
individuals remain a relatively shorter time in poverty if they have managed to 
leave deprivation for some time most recently. 
Turning to results on non-poverty spells, we observe that the shape of the 
first re-entry hazard is also consistent with negative duration dependence up to 
the third year, remaining constant thereafter. Interestingly we find little 
differences in the annual hazard rates of returning to poverty depending on the 
order of the non-poverty spell. The largest difference is observable after 
durations of three years or more and, in contrast with the impact of spell order 
in poverty experiences, re-entry hazard rates in the second non-poverty spell 
are lower than in the first one. This implies that once you have managed to step 
out of poverty once, the accumulation of non-poverty spells plays in your favour 
by reducing the probability of coming back to poverty. 
Figures 2 and 3 plot exit and re-entry hazard rates by spell order using the 
previous life-table results34. The common pattern of these estimated hazard 
functions is that they all show some negative duration dependence and all exits 
(and all re-entries) show a similar pattern to that of the first one. However, 
                                          
34  This figures plot estimations of the poverty hazard rates, which may be interpreted as a 
type of sample-average hazard function without controlling for individual characteristics. 
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thanks to the separate estimations by spell order, we already observe that the 
size of the second spell poverty hazard is significantly higher than that of the first 
spell, at least during the first three years of spell duration. In addition, the size of 
the first re-entry poverty hazard is higher than that of the second one. 
Figure 2 
LIFE-TABLE HAZARD RATES AS DURATION EVOLVES. ECHP 1994-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
LIFE-TABLE HAZARD RATES AS DURATION EVOLVES, BY SPELL ORDER. 
ECHP 1994-2000 
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5.2.   The main characteristics of individuals under analysis 
In any case, before going into a more detailed multivariate analysis of spells we 
must focus our discussion on the comparative characteristics of the samples of 
spells to be used in regressions. In order to do this we have constructed table 9 
where one can compare the characteristics of the sample of individuals who 
experience a left-censored spell (first spells, second pair of columns and second 
spells, third pair of columns) with those of the sample of individuals whose first 
transition into poverty is observed (inflow sample of spells, fourth pair of columns)35. 
Results show that there are some differences in the characteristics of 
individuals who suffer some left-censored poverty spell and those who are 
observed to enter poverty within the observation window. In particular, these 
differences are related to the household and household’s head socioeconomic 
and demographic characteristics more than to individual characteristics, even if 
the individual’s age and labour status is somewhat different too. In fact, if we 
were to use a sample of new entrants to poverty instead of using one of 
individuals with left-censored poverty spells, our sample would contain 
significantly younger individuals, more often active, living in households whose 
head is relatively young (often below 49 years of age), more educated, more 
often employed full time or unemployed but rarely retired, with more adults in 
the household (more often active in the labour market) and fewer children, 
whose main income source is wages and whose total household income is nearer 
to the poverty line and, in some cases, it is declared to be temporarily zero. As it 
could be expected, the characteristics of the sample of new entrants turn to be 
most similar to those of the individuals who, having experienced a first left-
censored spell, register a second poverty spell within the observation window. 
Focusing on poverty spell duration, we can see that the elapsed duration of 
poverty spells for individuals with left-censored spells is significantly longer: 2.4 
years compared to 1.7 years (more than eight months longer). This result 
clearly reflects the duration bias of choosing to discard left-censored spells 
completely when analysing poverty dynamics. Including the first and second spell 
in the analysis reduces duration to 2.2 years and includes non-poverty spells of a 
mean duration of 1.7 years in between poverty spells. 
In general, after these descriptive analyses, we can assert that the inclusion of 
left-censored spells in the regressions will influence multivariate results on first-spell 
hazard rates for the case of Spain by including individuals who have experienced 
poverty more persistently and, in general, due to their household composition, are 
                                          
35  Note that an extended version of this table appears in table A8. Note also that right 
censoring may imply also that the complete duration of a spell is not observed. We here refer 
to spell duration in terms of the observation of the spell since it begun until it finishes or 
suffers from attrition. 
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less likely to transit out of poverty. These effects, however, are less observable 
for those individuals who suffer poverty recall given that their characteristics are 
much more similar to those of a sample of new-entrants to poverty. 
Table 9 
CHARACTERISTICS OF SPELLS SAMPLES, INDIVIDUALS: MEANS 
POVERTY SPELLS 
Characteristics All spells 
(5,218 indiv.) 
(5,113 weight)
First spell 
(3,664 indiv.) 
(3,387weight)
Second spell  
(1,276 indiv.) 
(1,416 weight) 
Inflow sample 
of spells – 
new entrants 
(1,593 indiv.) 
(1,632 weight)
Individual Characteristics Means S.E. Means S.E. Means S.E. Means S.E. 
Age  36.21 22.21 36.61 22.81 35.41 21.21 35.21 21.21
   Aged 16-29 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.42 0.24 0.43 0.25 0.43
   Aged 60+ 0.18 0.39 0.20 0.40 0.16 0.37 0.16 0.37
Child, below 16 years old 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.43 0.22 0.42 0.22 0.42
Labour status         
    Working (+15 hours/week) 0.22 0.41 0.20 0.40 0.24 0.43 0.26 0.44
    Working (less 15 
hours/week) 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.10
    Unemployed 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.35 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.34
    Discouraged worker 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.13
    Economically inactive 0.38 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.38 0.49 0.36 0.48
Unemployment experience         
   Had unemployment spell last 
5 years 0.29 0.45 0.29 0.45 0.30 0.46 0.31 0.46
Main income source         
   No income from any source 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.29 0.46 0.27 0.44
   Wages and salaries 0.13 0.34 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.35 0.19 0.39
   Self-employment or farming 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.23
   Pensions 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.32 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29
   Unemployment  benefits 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.25
   Any other social benefits  0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.24
   Private income 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.21
(Sigue) 
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(Continuación) 
POVERTY SPELLS 
Characteristics All spells 
(5,218 indiv.) 
(5,113 weight)
First spell 
(3,664 indiv.) 
(3,387weight)
Second spell  
(1,276 indiv.) 
(1,416 weight) 
Inflow sample 
of spells – 
new entrants 
(1,593 indiv.) 
(1,632 weight)
Individual Characteristics Means S.E. Means S.E. Means S.E. Means S.E. 
Household Characteristics         
Household structure         
   Total household members 4.16 1.68 4.09 1.69 4.27 1.63 4.17 1.59
   Number of adults in 
household 3.06 1.35 2.99 1.32 3.15 1.43 3.10 1.40
   Number of 0-5 children 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.43 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.41
Main income source          
Wages and salaries 0.34 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.38 0.49 0.42 0.49
Self-employment income 0.15 0.36 0.13 0.33 0.18 0.38 0.14 0.34
Pensions income 0.23 0.42 0.25 0.43 0.20 0.40 0.21 0.41
Unemployment income 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.35 0.10 0.30 0.13 0.34
Transfers income 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.27
Private income 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.16
Poverty Gap (as % of poverty line) 
0-10% 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.28 0.45
Zero income 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.25 0.07 0.25
Household head characteristics         
Household head aged 30-39 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.23 0.42 0.27 0.44
Household head aged 40-49 0.26 0.44 0.24 0.43 0.29 0.45 0.28 0.45
Household head aged 50-59 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.19 0.39
Household head aged 60+ 0.24 0.43 0.29 0.45 0.16 0.36 0.12 0.33
Female household head 0.14 0.35 0.12 0.33 0.18 0.38 0.15 0.35
Separated, Divorced or Widowed 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.32 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.25
Head is in paid work, more 
than 15 hours  0.53 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.60 0.49 0.64 0.48
Head is working part-time  0.07 0.25 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.27 0.05 0.21
(Sigue) 
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POVERTY SPELLS 
Characteristics All spells 
(5,218 indiv.) 
(5,113 weight)
First spell 
(3,664 indiv.) 
(3,387weight)
Second spell  
(1,276 indiv.) 
(1,416 weight) 
Inflow sample 
of spells – 
new entrants 
(1,593 indiv.) 
(1,632 weight)
Individual Characteristics Means S.E. Means S.E. Means S.E. Means S.E. 
Head retired 0.15 0.36 0.19 0.39 0.09 0.28 0.06 0.24
Head unemployed  0.17 0.38 0.15 0.35 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42
Number of earners in 
household (active) 1.61 1.14 1.58 1.13 1.63 1.15 1.61 1.12
Head university education 0.041 0.20 0.03 0.16 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24
Head secondary education 0.071 0.25 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.28 0.13 0.34
Characteristics of Spells         
Non-censored observations 0.63 0.48 0.68 0.47 0.59 0.49 0.68 0.47
Elapsed duration (years) 2.17 1.68 2.40 1.90 1.82 1.06 1.67 1.19
Lagged poverty duration (years)   — — 1.78 1.02   
Lagged accum. pov. duration 
(years) 
  — — 3.60 1.39 
  
Lagged non-poverty duration 
(years) 
  — — 1.73 1.02 
  
Lagged accum. non pov. 
duration (years) 
  — — 1.73 1.02 
  
Note:   These results omit the percentage of missings in variables for which children have no 
information available. 
5.3.   Estimation results on poverty exits and re-entries 
In this sub-section, we estimate several discrete hazard models taking into 
account the individual’s complete poverty history in order to analyse the 
determinants of leaving or re-entering poverty in Spain. We are interested in 
obtaining the evolution of the hazard rates as poverty and non-poverty spells 
evolve after controlling for demographic and socio-economic individual and 
household characteristics as well as for lagged poverty and non poverty 
durations. Table 10 presents the estimated hazard regressions for all exits and 
re-entries controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and distinguishing the spell 
order, therefore considering multiple exit and multiple re-entry periods are not 
independent.
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The models considered include covariates such as gender, head of 
household age and education, head job positions, head qualifications, 
household composition distinguishing single parents and households with 
dependent children, number of earners in the household, the length of the 
current poverty and non-poverty spells and the duration of the lagged poverty 
spells36. 
As one would expect, table 10 confirms that effects of a covariate on 
poverty exit and re-entry has the opposite sign in most of the cases. Thus, 
characteristics that help in leaving poverty also help in avoiding recurrence. 
Exit rates from poverty are higher if the household’s head has a high 
educational attainment or there is a large number of earners in the household. 
However, there are variables that present interesting differences in their 
effects depending on the number of accumulated spells experienced by 
individuals. Figure 4 plots the baseline hazard rate (duration and duration 
squared) for poverty and non-poverty exits after controlling for observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity. For individuals in their first observed poverty spell 
(many of them left-censored), we find some negative duration dependence 
from the first year of spell duration37, while for those experiencing a second 
spell, the effect of duration is very different. Indeed, the probability of leaving a 
second poverty spell increases (even if less and less each year) at the beginning 
of the spell (approximately during three years), and from then after, the 
probability of leaving poverty starts to decrease as duration evolves. This 
pattern could be explained by the fact that first spells may have lasted more 
than three years already at their first year of observation. We also observe 
here that, for the case of poverty recall the hazard shifts down when spells 
accumulate (i.e. the second non-poverty spell observed). Thus, the probability 
of re-entering poverty in a second period does not grow when the non-
poverty spell is still short (as it happens with poverty spells) it is always lower 
as the spell duration increases. Finally, we observe that the probability of 
experiencing a second re-entry poverty is lower for those that had one already 
and, in contrast, having a second exit from poverty is relatively more probable 
when one has had one. 
 
                                          
36  We fitted a variety of other alternative specifications. For example, we considered 
including unemployment rates and GDP growth rate but they were not statistically significant 
and the distribution of the estimated parameters was very imprecise. Therefore, these 
covariates we not kept in the specifications reported here. 
37  Biewen (2003) finds similar negative duration effects for German individuals. 
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Figure 4 
THE SHAPE OF THE PREDICTED HAZARD RATE FOR POVERTY AND 
NON POVERTY EXITS 
(after controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity) at the mean of 
covariates. ECHP 1994-2000. 
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Table 10 also shows that individuals who experience poverty are more likely to 
experience poverty in future because the longer the previous poverty duration the 
less likely individuals will leave a second poverty spell. Therefore, there is some 
state dependence poverty effect38 in individuals’ poverty histories. Alternatively, 
the time spent out of poverty plays the opposite role: the longer the time the 
individual is out of poverty, the lower the probability of poverty recall. Also, the 
effects of lagged durations have the expected sign: lagged poverty duration reduces 
the exit hazard and lagged non-poverty duration reduces the recall hazard. 
Another observable difference in the effect of covariates when spells 
accumulate is that being a male significantly increases the individual’s probability 
of leaving poverty (a 11.5 percent) only for first spells while for a second 
poverty spell, gender does not affect the individual’s chances to leave poverty39. 
                                          
38  This effect is also detected by Biewen (2004) in Germany. The explanations are twofold. 
On one hand, individuals who are poor in one period have observed characteristics such as 
human capital decay, unemployment, health problems or difficult living arrangements that 
make poverty prone. On the other hand, they present unobserved heterogeneity terms such 
as lack of intelligence or ability, low levels of motivation or unfavourable attitudes. 
39  Other papers with a variety of data sources for Spain in different periods since 1985 find that 
couples with three or more children are the type of households who are more prone to be in 
poverty - see García-Serrano et al. (2001), Cantó (2002 and 2003), Cantó and Mercader (2002), 
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Interestingly, household composition covariates show a particularly strong 
explanatory power in all regressions. However, regarding the differences in the 
magnitude of their effects on poverty exit and re-entry, we observe that their 
effect is stronger on re-entries than on exits. Thus, household composition plays 
a somewhat more relevant role in protecting the vulnerable than in promoting 
the poor. More in particular, one person households, single parents or couples 
with one or two children are more likely to suffer transitory poverty than couples 
with three or more children. Couples with three or more children are the type of 
households who are more prone to be in poverty across time because they have 
the lowest probability of leaving it and the highest of returning to it. 
Household head age variables turn out to have a significantly different effect 
on poverty exits by spell order. Indeed, the distinction of first and second 
poverty spells shows that any advantageous situation of youths disappears if 
individuals are fluctuating often between poverty and non-poverty. Indeed, only 
in first poverty spells individuals below 30 years of age show a higher probability 
of leaving poverty in comparison with those in their thirties or forties. In 
contrast, for those in their second poverty spell, head of household’s age does 
not have a significant effect on the exit hazard rate. 
5.4.   Estimation results on poverty exit and re-entry: only new entrants 
The above discussion assumes that the poverty duration of all spells is known. 
However, our sample selection implies that for an important number of spells in 
our analysis we do not know how long a spell has been in progress in 199440. 
Our analysis, until now, has only controlled for left-censoring by estimating 
the exit hazard of left-truncated spells separately from the rest. We believe that 
this may not be enough and that we should perform some check of our main 
results using a sample of new entrants to poverty in 1995 and following their 
future movements out and back into poverty across the period 1995-200041. 
Results on spell duration pooling the data for all the poverty and non-poverty 
periods are reported in table 11. The last row of this table reflects that, as it 
                                                                                                                                 
Cantó et al. (2003) or Ayala (2006) and Ayala et al. (2006)-. Most recently Arranz and García-Serrano 
(2007) using data from the Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida (ECV) reach a similar conclusion. 
40  Ignoring the existence of left-censored spells is common practice in poverty dynamics 
analysis. For example, Stevens (1999) indicates that erasing spells in progress at the start of 
the sample provokes a form of sample selection bias. Thus, she asserts that considering 
individuals who begin a new spell after the start window period is likely to have higher 
transition probabilities than the entire population because they would have experienced at 
least one transition since the start window period. 
41  Note Heckman and Singer (1984) indicate that the estimations of models ignoring 
unobserved heterogeneity that use only those spells that begin after the start of the sampling 
period should give consistent estimates of poverty transition rates for the total population. 
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would be expected, persistence of poverty when we choose to use only non-left-
censored spells drops to 4.6 (from 9.4 in table 4). We find that only 12 per cent 
of the individuals remain four years or more in poverty, while in our previous 
sample (see table 4) the percentage of individuals in this situation was 26.2. 
Table 11 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF ELAPSED DURATIONS, ALL SPELLS. 
Sample restricted to individuals who enter poverty in 1995. 
ECHP 1994-2000. (New entrants sample) 
all poverty spells All non-poverty spells 
Elapsed duration 
Freq % Freq % 
1 614 54.1 263 29.1 
2 251 22.1 209 23.1 
3 133 11.7 153 16.9 
4 160 15.3 196 10.6 
5 124 12.1 185 20.4 
6 152 14.6   
7     
Total individuals 1,134 100 907 100 
Mean (Std. Dev.) 1.93 (1.34) 2.71(1.49) 
 
Tables 12 and 13 focus on the frequency distribution of elapsed poverty and 
non-poverty spells by order of occurrence of the particular spell. Our findings in 
these tables highlight that when we select individuals whose first spell is not left-
censored, recurrence is more likely: out of the 1,134 individuals who are enter 
poverty since 1995, 35 per cent have two occurrences along the time of 
observation (compared to the 27 per cent of the previous sample)42. This 
implies that a 38 per cent of the individuals re-enter poverty during the seven 
year period and a 17 per cent of them re-enter twice. In terms of duration, 
table 13 shows that first-spells have a mean duration of 1.7 years, similar to that 
of second spells (1.6 years) while the duration of third poverty spells is slightly 
shorter (1.5 years)43. 
Indeed, 67 per cent of first poverty spells have an elapsed duration of one 
year and this percentage, instead of increasing as in the previous sample, drops 
                                          
42  Note however that, most probably due to the limited length of the panel, only 2.5 per cent 
(in comparison with 7.5 per cent) have three or more occurrences. 
43  This result could be affected by the seven year interview structure of the dataset. 
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to 59 per cent if we are in a second occurrence. The percentage drops slightly 
more, to a 53 per cent, in a third spell. This means that if one experiences 
poverty recall, spells are likely to be somewhat longer. This could be explained by 
a stronger impact of negative duration dependence when individuals begin their 
experience in poverty. If this were the case, any recall will also have a stronger 
effect on their chances to leave poverty again within our observation window, 
making individuals more prone to remain in poverty as spells accumulate. 
Table 12 
NUMBER OF SPELLS OF POVERTY AND NON-POVERTY IN NEW ENTRANTS SAMPLE. 
Sample restricted to individuals who enter poverty in 1995. 
ECHP 1994-2000. (New entrants sample) 
Poverty Non-Poverty 
Number of occurrences 
Freq. % Freq. % 
1 703 61.99 705 62.17 
2 403 35.54 195 17.20 
3 128 12.47 116 10.53 
Total individuals 1,134 100 906 79.91 
Nota:   The percentages are calculated over the total sample of individuals (1,134). 
Table 13 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF ELAPSED DURATIONS BY ORDER OF OCCURRENCE. 
Sample restricted to individuals who enter poverty in 1995. 
ECHP 1994-2000. (New entrants sample) 
First poverty 
spell 
First non-
poverty spell
Second 
poverty spell
Second non-
poverty spell
Third 
poverty spell 
Third non-
poverty spellElapsed 
duration 
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % 
1 767 67.64 344 37.97 256 59.40 101 50.25 15 53.57 6 100
2 171 15.08 167 18.43 102 23.67 161 30.35 13 46.43 — — 
3 177 16.79 114 12.58 156 12.99 139 19.40 — — — — 
4 143 13.79 196 10.60 117 13.94 — — — — — — 
5 124 12.12 185 20.42 — — — — — — — — 
6 152 14.59 — — — — — — — — — — 
7 — — — — — — — — — — — — 
Total 
individuals 1,134 100 906 100 431 100 201 100 28 100 6 100
Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
1.71 
(1.32) 
2.57 
(1.56) 
1.61 
(0.86) 
1.69 
(0.78) 
1.46 
(0.51) 
1 
(0) 
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Tables 14 and 15 display the life-table estimates of hazard rates, survival 
probability and cumulative failure for this second sample. Table 14 illustrates that 
both types of spells show a decline of the transition hazard as duration evolves, thus 
supporting the idea of negative duration dependence for both situations. However, 
some differences are already observable between the exit and re-entry hazards. 
First, the probability of returning to poverty is now much lower than the probability 
of exiting from poverty. Thus, non-poverty spells, in general are of a much longer 
duration than poverty spells for this particular group. Secondly, both the entry and 
the re-entry hazard decline strongly after 1 year while declining much less from 
then onwards. This implies that some part of these individuals suffer a type of 
transitory and recurrent poverty which could be classified as “fluctuating”. 
Distinguishing the order of spells and thus analysing the effects of spell 
accumulation is one our main objectives. Therefore, in table 15 we include 
results on transition rates for each spell type by their order of occurrence. We 
can see that the results in table 14 are similar to those obtained for the first spell 
of poverty or non-poverty in table 15 but are clearly different from those 
obtained for the second poverty spell. 
Table 14 
LIFE TABLES ESTIMATES OF HAZARD RATES, SURVIVAL PROBABILITY AND 
CUMULATIVE FAILURE FOR ALL POVERTY EXITS AND RE-ENTRIES. 
Based on all poverty spells observed from ECHP waves 
1994-2000 for individuals who enter poverty in 1995 
Interval 
(years) 
Total number of 
individuals at risk 
Total (individuals) 
Deaths Lost 
Survival
(%) 
Cum. 
Failure 
(%) 
Std. 
Error 
Hazard 
(%) 
Std. 
Error
All exits 
1     2 1593 799 239 45.78 54.22 1.31 74.39 2.44 
2     3 1555 173 113 29.89 70.11 1.29 41.99 3.12 
3     4 1269 185 148 19.52 80.48 1.24 41.98 4.45 
4     5 1136 139 121 13.45 86.55 1.18 36.79 5.79 
5     6 1176 117 117 10.31 89.71 1.12 26.56 6.39 
6     7 1152 110 152 10.31 89.71 1.12 11. 10 — 
7     8 — — — — — — — — 
All re-entries 
1     2 1114 269 182 73.68 26.32 1.38 30.31 1.83 
2     3 1663 199 130 61.47 38.53 1.61 18.07 1.81 
3     4 1434 157 194 52.39 47.61 1.76 15.94 2.11 
4     5 1283 134 164 45.27 54.73 1.91 14.59 2.51 
5     6 1185 110 185 45.27 54.73 1.91 11. 10 — 
6     7 — — — — — — — — 
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Table 15 
LIFE TABLES ESTIMATES OF HAZARD RATES, SURVIVAL PROBABILITY AND 
CUMULATIVE FAILURE BY ORDER OF OCCURRENCE. 
Based on all poverty spells observed from ECHP waves 
1994-2000 for individuals who enter poverty in 1995 
Interval 
(years) 
Total number of 
individuals at risk 
Deaths Lost Survival 
(%) 
Cum. 
Failure (%)
Std. 
Error 
Hazar
d (%) 
Std. 
Error
First poverty spell (1) 
1     2 11341 645 122 39.89 60.11 1.49 85.94 3.06 
2     3 367 136 35 24.37 75.63 1.38 48.31 4.02 
3     4 196 169 8 15.61 84.39 1.22 43.81 5.15 
4     5 119 139 4 10.41 89.59 1.06 40.11 6.28 
5     6 176 117 7 17.97 92.03 0.96 26.56 6.39 
6     7 152 110 52 17.97  0.96 0  
7     8         
First non-poverty spell (2) 
1     2 906 242 102 71.71 28.31 1.54 32.97 2.09 
2     3 562 198 169 58.38 41.62 1.75 20.48 2.06 
3     4 395 157 157 49.31 50.71 1.84 16.86 2.23 
4     5 281 134 162 42.59 57.41 1.92 14.59 2.51 
5     6 185 110 185 42.59 57.41 1.92 0  
6     7         
Second poverty spell (3) 
1     2 431 148 108 60.74 39.26 2.51 48.84 3.89 
2     3 175 137 165 44.97 55.03 2.91 29.84 4.85 
3     4 173 116 140 31.39 68.61 3.49 35.56 8.75 
4     5 117 110 117 31.39 68.61 3.49 0  
5     6         
Second non-poverty spell (4) 
1     2 201 127 174 83.54 16.46 2.91 17.94 3.44 
2     3 100 111 160 82.34 17.66 3.09 11.44 1.44 
3     4 139 110 139 82.34 17.66 3.09 0  
4     5         
(Sigue) 
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(Continuación) 
Interval 
(years) 
Total number of 
individuals at risk 
Deaths Lost Survival 
(%) 
Cum. 
Failure (%)
Std. 
Error 
Hazar
d (%) 
Std. 
Error
Third poverty spell (5) 
1     2 128 116 119 74.47 25.53 8.99 29.27 11.82
2     3 113 110 113 74.47 25.53 8.99 0  
3     4         
Third non-poverty spell (6) 
1     2 116 110 116 100 0 0 0 0 
2     3         
 
Do these conclusions make our results change regarding the implications of 
experiencing a second occurrence in poverty (after having experienced a period 
of non-poverty)? We observe that the probability that someone is able to leave 
poverty when experiencing a second occurrence is now significantly lower than 
it was during his/her first poverty spell. Indeed, during the first year the hazard 
rate in the second poverty period is 37 percentage points lower than in the first 
one, even if the difference drops to 19 per cent and 8 per cent respectively 
during the second and third year. Thus, we find evidence that if we select 
individuals who have a had a transition into poverty in order to analyse 
dynamics, it is likely that the probability of leaving poverty for this group will be 
higher than otherwise only during the first poverty spell (especially the first 
year). This hazard will be significantly lower in subsequent spells if the 
household manages to step out of poverty relatively soon. 
Finally, in table 16 we present results of the estimation of a hazard model 
with this sample of spells, using the same specification as that in Table 10. 
Results indicate that negative duration dependence still holds for first poverty 
spells, thus individuals who experience poverty are more likely to experience 
poverty in future also using this sample. Further, leaving a second poverty spell 
is less likely if one has experienced a previous poverty and more the longer that 
period was. Therefore, we confirm the previous result on the existence of some 
state dependence effect in individuals’ poverty histories. 
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Regarding the effect of covariates, results are fairly similar, even if, in general, 
covariates are less significant probably due to the reduction of the sample. In 
particular, the head of household education and labour market situation is an 
important determinant of exits and re-entries and household composition 
continues to have a particularly strong influence on re-entries. 
6.   CONCLUSIONS 
This paper analyses the effect of spell recurrence on poverty dynamics taking 
into account multiple poverty and non-poverty spells (the complete poverty 
history) by spell order and incorporating individual and household characteristics 
as well as unobserved heterogeneity. In particular, we investigate if the 
probability of experiencing a poverty transition is significantly different when the 
length of the current and past poverty spells changes. For that purpose we use a 
sample of Spanish individuals who are poor in 1994 and follow their future 
movements into and out of poverty across the period 1994-2000. 
First of all, our findings highlight the importance of considering multiple spells 
in the analysis of poverty dynamics. Indeed, 27 per cent have two occurrences 
along the time of observation and nearly 7.5 per cent have three or more 
occurrences within a seven-year observation window. Also, we find that the 
probability of returning to poverty is significantly lower than the probability of 
exiting from poverty. Thus, non-poverty spells, in general are of a longer 
duration than poverty spells. Furthermore, the re-entry hazard continues to 
decline after three years of spell evolution while the exit hazard rate 
experiences a rapid decline during the first three years but is fairly constant 
from then onwards. 
Our descriptive analysis already offers us some easily observable differences 
between the exit and re-entry hazards when spells are evaluated jointly 
compared to when spell order is taken into account. Thus, distinguishing the 
order of spells and analysing the effects of spell accumulation we can see that 
the results from joint estimation of the poverty exit hazard are similar to those 
obtained for the first spell of poverty but are somewhat different from those 
obtained for the second poverty spell. This result underlines the importance of 
considering different hazard rates when the individual accumulates multiple 
experiences in and out of poverty. 
In particular, we observe that the probability that an individual steps out of 
poverty when experiencing a second occurrence is significantly higher than it was 
during her first poverty spell. The largest difference is observable after durations 
of three years or more. In contrast, re-entry hazard rates in the second non-
poverty spell are lower than in the first one, which implies that once you have 
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managed to step out of poverty once, the accumulation of non-poverty spells 
plays in your favour by reducing the probability of coming back to poverty. 
Secondly, our results confirm that the characteristics of poverty duration in 
Spain are significantly different for individuals living in a household whose head is 
working-age compared to the rest. Their mean annual poverty rate of is 
significantly higher than that of the rest but, in terms of dynamics, they have a 
similar chronic poverty level (approximately a 3 per cent of all individuals in the 
sample are always poor) and a larger percentage of transitory and recurrent 
poor individuals. 
Thirdly, our multivariate regressions confirm that the effect of a covariate on 
poverty exit and re-entry is the opposite in most cases. Thus, characteristics 
that help individuals in leaving poverty also help them in avoiding recurrence. 
The highest poverty exit rates are associated to individuals with shorter 
durations in poverty, who have a large number of earners in their household and 
whose household head holds a high educational qualification. In general, we find 
some negative duration dependence both in leaving and re-entering poverty, even 
if, the effect is most significant in first poverty spells while in second poverty 
spells results show some positive duration dependence during the first three 
years of spell duration that changes to being negative after that period. Also, 
lagged durations have the expected sign: lagged poverty duration reduces the 
probability of leaving a poverty spell and lagged non-poverty durations 
decreases the probability of re-entering poverty in a second non-poverty spell. 
Interestingly also the estimated coefficients capturing the effect of covariates 
on exit and re-entry hazard rates change in magnitude and significance when we 
separate spells by their order. Household composition turns out to have a 
particularly strong effect on re-entries, especially in second non-poverty spells. 
In contrast, these variables are not significant for determining the exit hazard in 
second poverty spells while for first poverty spells, even if significant, they show 
smaller coefficients. Those households in worst position are couples with three 
or more children who have a lower probability of stepping out of poverty and a 
higher probability of re-entering it after exit. Thus, they are more likely to suffer 
long-term poverty. In contrast, individuals in one person households, single 
parents and couples with no children or one child have a significantly lower 
probability of re-entering poverty once they managed to step out of it. 
Finally, we have tried to check the validity of our main results using a sample 
of spells which, by definition, is not left-censored. Results indicate that this 
sample is more likely to include individuals that are “fluctuating” between 
poverty and non-poverty often. Therefore, in this second sample, if second 
poverty spells last more than a year, the hazard after that moment is significantly 
smaller than it was in our first sample. This result puts forward evidence that 
shows that if we try to avoid the problems imposed by left-censoring by 
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selecting a sample of individuals who have had a transition into poverty, it is 
likely that the probability of leaving poverty we will obtain will be higher than 
otherwise during a first spell (and especially for the first year). This hazard will 
be significantly lower is subsequent spells if the household manages to step out 
of poverty relatively soon. Regarding the effects of covariates, results are fairly 
similar than those obtained with our first sample, even if less significant due to a 
large sample reduction. In particular, the head of household education and 
labour market situation is determinant for exits and re-entries and household 
composition continues to have a particularly strong influence on re-entries.
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Table A3 
POVERTY INCIDENCE AND SHORT-TERM PERSISTENCE. 
Sample including individuals that join the panel 
(with and without selection, weighted) ECHP 1994-2000 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Incidence        
Headcount index (% poor) 
(over sample size) 17.29 16.03 14.05 15.21 12.99 12.62 11.61
Headcount index (% poor) (over 
sample size without missing values) 19.88 19.67 18.46 21.32 19.43 20.16 18.99
Conditional probabilities        
Poverty persistence 
Prob (yt=1/yt-1=1)  52.31 48.3 53.17 51.27 53.23 53.45
Poverty entry occurs 
Prob (yt=1/yt-1=0)  17.87 17.82 10.61 17.22 18.74 18.34
Poverty exit occurs 
Prob (yt=0/yt-1=1)  35.17 39.85 33.76 38.35 36.69 39.3 
Persistence out of poverty 
Prob (yt=0/yt-1=0)  81.58 80.21 78.85 82.28 79.72 84.27
Atrittion occurs        
Prob (yt=mis/yt-1=0)  10.54 11.99 10.55 10.51 11.54 17.39
Prob (yt=mis/yt-1=1)  12.51 11.85 13.07 10.38 10.08 17.25
Individuals join panel        
Prob (yt=1/yt-1=mis)  18.74 15.81 15.28 13.39 13.11 11.94
Prob (yt=0/yt-1=mis)  19.79 16.59 19.15 16.39 15.91 14.64
Prob (yt=mis/yt-1=mis)  71.47 77.61 85.56 90.22 90.99 93.42
Sample size 22,53922,53922,53922,53922,539 22,539 22,539
Sample size, no missing values 19,04417,75416,49615,40214,519 13,740 13,251
Notes:   yt=1 if the individual is in poverty at time t and yt=0  if the individual is out of poverty 
at time t, yt=mis if individual information is missing (attrition occurred or individual not 
present in the ECHP panel that year). 
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Table A4 
INCIDENCE OF POVERTY, POVERTY PERSISTENCE AND TRANSITIONS. 
Sample of new-entrants to poverty 
(with and without selection, weighted) ECHP 1994-2000 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Incidence        
Headcount index (% poor) 
(over sample size) 
 
100 31.08 33.23 24.50 25.70 24.35
Headcount index (% poor) (over 
sample size without missing values)  100 35.94 44.12 34.80 36.96 36.63
Conditional probabilities        
Poverty persistence 
Prob (yt=1/yt-1=1) 
 
 31.08 49.87 49.08 55.15 66.36
Poverty entry occurs 
Prob (yt=1/yt-1=0) 
 
  32.03 16.39 21.27 14.47
Poverty exit occurs 
Prob (yt=0/yt-1=1) 
 
 55.41 34.81 39.72 36.79 26.72
Persistence out of poverty 
Prob (yt=0/yt-1=0) 
 
  56.17 74.27 71.84 76.86
Atrittion occurs        
Prob (yt=mis/yt-1=0)    11.81 19.33 16.89 18.67
Prob (yt=mis/yt-1=1)   13.52 15.32 11.21 18.07 16.92
Sample size  1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244
Sample size, no missing values (4)  1,244 1,076 937 876 865 827 
Notes:   yt=1 if the individual is in poverty at time t and yt=0  if the individual is out of poverty 
at time t, yt=mis if individual information is missing (attrition occurred or individual not 
present in the ECHP panel that year). 
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales 
— 57 — 
Table A5 
POVERTY INCIDENCE AND SHORT-TERM PERSISTENCE. INDIVIDUALS AGE <16. 
ECHP 1994-2000 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Incidence        
Headcount index (% poor) 23.83 23.89 24.27 25.4 25.71 25.87 27.55
Conditional probabilities        
Poverty short-term persistence 
Prob (yt=1/yt-1=1)  57.78 56.72 56.23 59.83 57.96 61.58
Poverty entry occurs 
Prob (yt=1/yt-1=0)  10.31 10.31 12.37 19.86 12.02 11.41
Poverty exit occurs 
Prob (yt=0/yt-1=1)  30.97 33.06 28.77 33.02 33.92 33.62
Persistence out of poverty 
Prob (yt=0/yt-1=0)  81.21 79.67 77.6 81.69 78.84 82.19
Atrittion        
Prob (yt=mis/yt-1=0)  18.49 10.03 10.03 18.45 19.14 16.41
Prob (yt=mis/yt-1=1)  11.25 10.23 15.11 17.15 18.13 14.81
Note:   These results are obtained using the ECHP contemporary income and characteristics 
information and using a modified OECD equivalence scale. Calculations of headcound index 
are made for individuals weighted by their population weight each particular year. The sample 
here is that of all individuals present in 1994 and in consecutive interviews in the ECHP panel 
until the survey ends or they suffer from attrition. Note that yt=1 if the individual is poor in 
time t and 0 if the individual is non-poor, “mis”means that attrition occurred. 
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Table A6 
POVERTY INCIDENCE AND SHORT-TERM PERSISTENCE. 
INDIVIDUALS AGE >=16 AND <= 65. ECHP 1994-2000 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Incidence        
Headcount index (% poor) 19.4 18.74 17.41 21.24 18.38 18.75 17.31
Conditional probabilities        
Poverty short-term persistence 
Prob (yt=1/yt-1=1)  50.81 45.85 52.66 47.79 51.19 50.65
Poverty entry occurs 
Prob (yt=1/yt-1=0)  17.74 17.86 10.97 17.01 18.02 17.71
Poverty exit occurs 
Prob (yt=0/yt-1=1)  37.37 42.61 35.49 41.85 38.83 43.21
Persistence out of poverty        
Prob (yt=0/yt-1=0)  81.91 80.35 78.71 83.27 81.09 85.53
Atrittion        
Prob (yt=mis/yt-1=0)  10.35 11.79 10.32 19.72 10.89 16.76
Prob (yt=mis/yt-1=1)  11.82 11.55 11.85 10.36 9.98 16.15
Note:   See note in Table A6. 
Table A7 
POVERTY INCIDENCE AND SHORT-TERM PERSISTENCE. INDIVIDUALS AGE > 65. 
ECHP 1994-2000 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Incidence        
Headcount index (% poor) 17.07 14.83 12.86 15.30 14.38 17.61 17.88
Conditional probabilities        
Poverty short-term persistence 
Prob (yt=1/yt-1=1)  49.21 52.72 61.87 58.13 64.21 60.42
Poverty entry occurs 
Prob (yt=1/yt-1=0)  15.27 13.62 16.42 14.27 18.25 18.24
Poverty exit occurs 
Prob (yt=0/yt-1=1)  31.45 33.73 27.97 26.87 25.85 26.04
Persistence out of poverty 
Prob (yt=0/yt-1=0)  80.53 82.09 83.23 83.46 79.76 82.26
Atrittion        
Prob (yt=mis/yt-1=0)  14.21 14.29 10.36 12.27 12.11 19.51
Prob (yt=mis/yt-1=1)  19.34 13.55 10.16 15.11 19.95 13.54
Note:   See note in Table A6. 
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Table A8 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLES OF POVERTY SPELLS, 
INDIVIDUALS: MEANS AND STANDARD ERRORS 
POVERTY SPELLS 
Characteristics All spells 
(5,218 indiv.) 
(5,113 weight)
First spell 
(3,664 indiv.) 
(3,387weight)
Second spell  
(1,276 indiv.) 
(1,416 weight) 
Inflow sample 
of spells – 
new entrants 
(1,593 indiv.) 
(1,632 weight)
Individual Characteristics Means S.E. Means S.E. Means S.E. Means S.E. 
Age  36.2 22.2 36.6 22.8 35.4 21.2 35.2 21.2
   Aged 0-5 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.26 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.21
   Aged 6-12 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.28 0.13 0.34 0.10 0.30
   Aged 13-15 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.23
   Aged 16-29 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.42 0.24 0.43 0.25 0.43
   Aged 30-39 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.35
   Aged 40-49 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.31 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.33
   Aged 49-59 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.34 0.11 0.31
   Aged 60+ 0.18 0.39 0.20 0.40 0.16 0.37 0.16 0.37
Child, below 16 years old 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.43 0.22 0.42 0.22 0.42
Gender         
    Male 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50
Level of Education         
    University 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22
    Secondary 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.29 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31
    Primary 0.63 0.48 0.63 0.48 0.62 0.49 0.61 0.49
Marital status         
    Married 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.50
    Separated 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.10
    Divorced 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.07
    Widowed      0.04 0.20 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.19 0.05 0.21
    Never married 0.23 0.42 0.21 0.41 0.24 0.43 0.21 0.41
(Sigue) 
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(Continuación) 
POVERTY SPELLS 
Characteristics All spells 
(5,218 indiv.) 
(5,113 weight)
First spell 
(3,664 indiv.) 
(3,387weight)
Second spell  
(1,276 indiv.) 
(1,416 weight) 
Inflow sample 
of spells – 
new entrants 
(1,593 indiv.) 
(1,632 weight)
Individual Characteristics Means S.E. Means S.E. Means S.E. Means S.E. 
Labour status         
    Working (+15 hours/week) 0.22 0.41 0.20 0.40 0.24 0.43 0.26 0.44
    Working 
    (less 15 hours/week) 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.10
    Unemployed 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.35 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.34
    Discouraged worker 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.13
    Economically inactive 0.38 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.38 0.49 0.36 0.48
Unemployment experience         
   Had unemp. Spell last 5 years 0.29 0.45 0.29 0.45 0.30 0.46 0.31 0.46
Main income source         
   No income from any source 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.29 0.46 0.27 0.44
   Wages and salaries 0.13 0.34 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.35 0.19 0.39
   Self-employment or farming 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.23
   Pensions 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.32 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29
   Unemployment  benefits 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.25
   Any other social benefits  0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.24
   Private income 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.21
Household Characteristics         
Household structure         
   Total household members 4.16 1.68 4.09 1.69 4.27 1.63 4.17 1.59
   Number of adults in 
household 3.06 1.35 2.99 1.32 3.15 1.43 3.10 1.40
   Number of 0-5 children 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.43 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.41
Main income source         
Wages and salaries 0.34 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.38 0.49 0.42 0.49
Self-employment income 0.15 0.36 0.13 0.33 0.18 0.38 0.14 0.34
(Sigue) 
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(Continuación) 
POVERTY SPELLS 
Characteristics All spells 
(5,218 indiv.) 
(5,113 weight)
First spell 
(3,664 indiv.) 
(3,387weight)
Second spell  
(1,276 indiv.) 
(1,416 weight) 
Inflow sample 
of spells – 
new entrants 
(1,593 indiv.) 
(1,632 weight)
Individual Characteristics Means S.E. Means S.E. Means S.E. Means S.E. 
Pensions income 0.23 0.42 0.25 0.43 0.20 0.40 0.21 0.41
Unemployment income 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.35 0.10 0.30 0.13 0.34
Transfers income 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.27
Private income 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.16
Housing          
    Owned 0.77 0.42 0.76 0.43 0.78 0.41 0.77 0.42
    Rented 0.13 0.33 0.14 0.35 0.11 0.31 0.13 0.33
    Rent-free 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.32 0.10 0.30
Poverty Gap (as % of poverty line) 
0-10% 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.28 0.45
10-25% 0.28 0.45 0.30 0.46 0.24 0.43 0.31 0.46
25-40% 0.17 0.37 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.37 0.14 0.35
40-50% 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.27 0.12 0.32 0.08 0.27
50-60% 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.23 0.09 0.29 0.05 0.21
60-75% 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.28 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.17
75-90% 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.19 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.13
90-99% 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.18
Zero income 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.25 0.07 0.25
Household head characteristics         
Household head aged 30-39 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.23 0.42 0.27 0.44
Household head aged 40-49 0.26 0.44 0.24 0.43 0.29 0.45 0.28 0.45
Household head aged 50-59 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.19 0.39
Household head aged 60+ 0.24 0.43 0.29 0.45 0.16 0.36 0.12 0.33
Female household head 0.14 0.35 0.12 0.33 0.18 0.38 0.15 0.35
Separated, Divorced or 
Widowed household head 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.32 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.25
(Sigue) 
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POVERTY SPELLS 
Characteristics All spells 
(5,218 indiv.) 
(5,113 weight)
First spell 
(3,664 indiv.) 
(3,387weight)
Second spell  
(1,276 indiv.) 
(1,416 weight) 
Inflow sample 
of spells – 
new entrants 
(1,593 indiv.) 
(1,632 weight)
Individual Characteristics Means S.E. Means S.E. Means S.E. Means S.E. 
Head is in paid work, more 
than 15 hours  0.53 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.60 0.49 0.64 0.48
Head is working part-time  0.07 0.25 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.27 0.05 0.21
Head retired   0.15 0.36 0.19 0.39 0.09 0.28 0.06 0.24
Head unemployed  0.17 0.38 0.15 0.35 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42
Number of earners in the 
household (active) 1.61 1.14 1.58 1.13 1.63 1.15 1.61 1.12
Head university education 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.16 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24
Head secondary education 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.28 0.13 0.34
Characteristics of Spells         
Non-censored observations 0.63 0.48 0.68 0.47 0.59 0.49 0.68 0.47
Elapsed duration (years) 2.17 1.68 2.40 1.90 1.82 1.06 1.67 1.19
Lagged poverty duration 
(years)   — — 1.78 1.02   
Lagged accumulated poverty 
duration (years)   — — 3.60 1.39   
Lagged non-poverty duration 
(years)   — — 1.73 1.02   
Lagged accumulated non 
poverty duration (years)   — — 1.73 1.02   
Note:   These results omit the percentage of missings in variables for which children have no 
information available. 
Source:   Own construction using the ECHP 1994-2000. 
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SÍNTESIS 
PRINCIPALES IMPLICACIONES DE POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA 
La literatura sobre pobreza ha dedicado importantes esfuerzos en los últimos años 
a analizar la dinámica de la parte más baja de la distribución de la renta. Un primer 
resultado claro de estas investigaciones es que debemos considerar a la duración de la 
pobreza como de una dimensión más de este fenómeno. Efectivamente, dentro de los 
individuos que clasificamos como pobres conviven diferentes tipos de pobreza en 
términos de su duración en el tiempo. Diferenciar a aquellos individuos con una mayor 
persistencia en la pobreza es claramente relevante para poder diseñar, de la forma 
más adecuada posible, las políticas sociales y de transferencias que pretendan reducir 
la tasa de pobreza. Luchar contra la pobreza de más largo plazo, persistente o crónica 
implicará el diseño de políticas de mayor calado como las educativas y sanitarias, 
especialmente para los niños, y también necesitará de complementos monetarios 
estables para los adultos. En cambio, para luchar contra la pobreza transitoria 
deberemos seguramente hacer un mayor hincapié en el diseño de políticas de 
mercado de trabajo a corto plazo que promuevan el empleo estable de los miembros 
activos del hogar y, además, en este caso, se podrán considerar de utilidad las 
transferencias monetarias temporales que funcionen como sustitutivos de renta en 
periodos cortos de falta de ingresos. 
El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar los determinantes de la probabilidad de que 
un individuo abandone una situación de pobreza y, por lo tanto, de que en lugar de 
pertenecer al grupo de los pobres crónicos, pertenezca al de los pobres transitorios. 
Además, a través de un análisis completo de la experiencia del individuo en pobreza a 
lo largo de siete años, diferenciamos entre los pobres transitorios a aquellos que son 
recurrentes, es decir, a aquellos que experimentan más de un episodio de pobreza. 
Para ello proponemos la estimación de un modelo econométrico novedoso en esta 
literatura, utilizado anteriormente para la estimación de historias de desempleo en la 
literatura más relacionada con la economía laboral o para la evaluación de la fertilidad 
a lo largo del ciclo vital en demografía, y que nos permite estimar la probabilidad de 
salida y re-entrada cuando los periodos de pobreza se acumulan. Esta característica de 
la modelización nos permite incluir el efecto de la acumulación de periodos de 
pobreza y no pobreza sobre la probabilidad de salida y re-entrada. Además, nuestro 
modelo aborda el problema de sesgo que provoca la omisión de los periodos 
censurados por la izquierda realizando estimaciones con y sin estos periodos y 
comprobando su efecto sobre los resultados. 
Otra interesante aportación de nuestro trabajo es la construcción una renta familiar 
contemporánea para ajustar los datos de manera que la información de las 
características del individuo y del hogar correspondan al mismo periodo de tiempo en 
el que se recibieron las rentas declaradas. La importancia de esta consideración ha 
sido ya apuntada por varios autores y los problemas de no realizar este ajuste son 
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importantes ya que, además, se incrementan cuando se pretenden relacionar los 
cambios en el ingreso anual del hogar (y por tanto también las salidas o entradas en la 
pobreza) con los cambios demográficos o laborales de los miembros del hogar. En 
concreto lo que hacemos es unir las características del individuo y el hogar declaradas 
en el momento t con las rentas declaradas en el momento t+1 que son las que 
coinciden como referencia temporal. 
Los resultados obtenidos indican que España es un país con una tasa de pobreza 
transitoria alta y, se observa, que ésta está más concentrada en individuos que habitan 
en hogares cuyo sustentador principal está en edad de realizar una actividad laboral, es 
decir tiene entre los 16 y 64 años. Además, también son este tipo de individuos los 
que experimentan una mayor tasa de pobreza recurrente con dos y hasta tres 
periodos de pobreza distintos a lo largo de un periodo de siete años. De hecho, gran 
parte de nuestros resultados econométricos resaltan la importancia de considerar los 
múltiples periodos de pobreza que ha tenido el individuo para determinar de forma 
más precisa su probabilidad de abandonar esa situación a corto plazo. 
La probabilidad de abandonar la pobreza disminuye de forma particularmente 
rápida durante los tres primeros años de duración del periodo de pobreza y, 
posteriormente, se estabiliza. Esto hace pensar que cuando un individuo permanece 
más de tres años en pobreza, podríamos decir que su situación se empieza a convertir 
en crónica. De otro lado, y como era de esperar, la acumulación de periodos de fuera 
de la pobreza juega a favor de incrementar la probabilidad de que el individuo la 
abandone de nuevo. Nuestros resultados también confirman que, en la mayoría de los 
casos, el efecto de las características demográficas y socioeconómicas de los individuos 
y sus hogares es opuesto en la determinación de la salida y la reentrada, es decir, que 
lo que ayuda a salir de la pobreza también ayuda a no retornar a ella y, a su vez, lo que 
provoca pobreza crónica también incrementa la probabilidad de retorno. 
La tasa de salida de la pobreza más alta la registran aquellos individuos con 
sustentadores principales de nivel educativo alto y en cuyos hogares conviven varios 
miembros perceptores de rentas. En contraste, la menor probabilidad de salida y 
mayor probabilidad de retorno y, por tanto, una mayor persistencia en la pobreza es 
sufrida por los que viven en pareja con tres o más hijos dependientes. Los individuos 
que viven solos, en hogares monoparentales o en pareja sin hijos o con sólo uno, 
experimentan una tasa de retorno a la pobreza significativamente menor que el resto 
de los hogares. Concluimos también que la eliminación de los episodios de pobreza 
censurados por la izquierda en la determinación econométrica de la probabilidad de 
salida la sesga al alza y reduce también la significatividad de los resultados por la 
reducción de la muestra. De todos modos, los resultados fundamentales del análisis 
econométrico se mantienen. 
 — 69 — 
NORMAS DE PUBLICACIÓN DE PAPELES DE TRABAJO DEL 
INSTITUTO DE ESTUDIOS FISCALES 
Esta colección de Papeles de Trabajo tiene como objetivo ofrecer un vehículo de 
expresión a todas aquellas personas interasadas en los temas de Economía Pública. Las 
normas para la presentación y selección de originales son las siguientes: 
1. Todos los originales que se presenten estarán sometidos a evaluación y podrán 
ser directamente aceptados para su publicación, aceptados sujetos a revisión, o 
rechazados. 
2. Los trabajos deberán enviarse por duplicado a la Subdirección de Estudios 
Tributarios. Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Avda. Cardenal Herrera Oria, 378. 28035 
Madrid. 
3. La extensión máxima de texto escrito, incluidos apéndices y referencias 
bibliográfícas será de 7000 palabras. 
4. Los originales deberán presentarse mecanografiados a doble espacio. En la primera 
página deberá aparecer el título del trabajo, el nombre del autor(es) y la institución a la 
que pertenece, así como su dirección postal y electrónica. Además, en la primera 
página aparecerá también un abstract de no más de 125 palabras, los códigos JEL y las 
palabras clave. 
5. Los epígrafes irán numerados secuencialmente siguiendo la numeración arábiga. 
Las notas al texto irán numeradas correlativamente y aparecerán al pie de la 
correspondiente página. Las fórmulas matemáticas se numerarán secuencialmente 
ajustadas al margen derecho de las mismas. La bibliografía aparecerá al final del 
trabajo, bajo la inscripción “Referencias” por orden alfabético de autores y, en cada 
una, ajustándose al siguiente orden: autor(es), año de publicación (distinguiendo a, b, c 
si hay varias correspondientes al mismo autor(es) y año), título del artículo o libro, 
título de la revista en cursiva, número de la revista y páginas. 
6. En caso de que aparezcan tablas y gráficos, éstos podrán incorporarse 
directamente al texto o, alternativamente, presentarse todos juntos y debidamente 
numerados al final del trabajo, antes de la bibliografía. 
7. En cualquier caso, se deberá adjuntar un disquete con el trabajo en formato word. 
Siempre que el documento presente tablas y/o gráficos, éstos deberán aparecer en 
ficheros independientes. Asimismo, en caso de que los gráficos procedan de tablas 
creadas en excel, estas deberán incorporarse en el disquete debidamente identificadas. 
 
Junto al original del Papel de Trabajo se entregará también un resumen 
de un máximo de dos folios que contenga las principales implicaciones de 
política económica que se deriven de la investigación realizada. 
  
 — 71 — 
PUBLISHING GUIDELINES OF WORKING PAPERS AT THE 
INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES 
This serie of Papeles de Trabajo (working papers) aims to provide those having an 
interest in Public Economics with a vehicle to publicize their ideas. The rules gover-
ning submission and selection of papers are the following: 
1. The manuscripts submitted will all be assessed and may be directly accepted for 
publication, accepted with subjections for revision or rejected. 
2. The papers shall be sent in duplicate to Subdirección General de Estudios 
Tributarios (The Deputy Direction of Tax Studies), Instituto de Estudios Fiscales 
(Institute for Fiscal Studies), Avenida del Cardenal Herrera Oria, nº 378, Madrid 
28035. 
3. The maximum length of the text including appendices and bibliography will be no 
more than 7000 words. 
4. The originals should be double spaced. The first page of the manuscript should 
contain the following information: (1) the title; (2) the name and the institutional affi-
liation of the author(s); (3) an abstract of no more than 125 words; (4) JEL codes and 
keywords; (5) the postal and e-mail address of the corresponding author. 
5. Sections will be numbered in sequence with arabic numerals. Footnotes will be 
numbered correlatively and will appear at the foot of the corresponding page. 
Mathematical formulae will be numbered on the right margin of the page in sequence. 
Bibliographical references will appear at the end of the paper under the heading 
“References” in alphabetical order of authors. Each reference will have to include in this 
order the following terms of references: author(s), publishing date (with an a, b or c in 
case there are several references to the same author(s) and year), title of the article or 
book, name of the journal in italics, number of the issue and pages. 
6. If tables and graphs are necessary, they may be included directly in the text or 
alternatively presented altogether and duly numbered at the end of the paper, before 
the bibliography. 
7. In any case, a floppy disk will be enclosed in Word format. Whenever the 
document provides tables and/or graphs, they must be contained in separate files. 
Furthermore, if graphs are drawn from tables within the Excell package, these must 
be included in the floppy disk and duly identified. 
 
Together with the original copy of the working paper a brief two-page 
summary highlighting the main policy implications derived from the 
research is also requested. 
  
 — 73 — 
ÚLTIMOS PAPELES DE TRABAJO EDITADOS POR EL 
INSTITUTO DE ESTUDIOS FISCALES 
2004 
01/04 Una propuesta para la regulación de precios en el sector del agua: el caso español. 
 Autores: M.a Ángeles García Valiñas y Manuel Antonio Muñiz Pérez. 
02/04 Eficiencia en educación secundaria e inputs no controlables: sensibilidad de los 
resultados ante modelos alternativos. 
 Autores: José Manuel Cordero Ferrera, Francisco Pedraja Chaparro y Javier Salinas Jiménez. 
03/04 Los efectos de la política fiscal sobre el ahorro privado: evidencia para la OCDE. 
 Autores: Montserrat Ferre Carracedo, Agustín García García y Julián Ramajo Hernández. 
04/04 ¿Qué ha sucedido con la estabilidad del empleo en España? Un análisis desagregado 
con datos de la EPA: 1987-2003. 
 Autores: José María Arranz y Carlos García-Serrano. 
05/04 La seguridad del empleo en España: evidencia con datos de la EPA (1987-2003). 
 Autores: José María Arranz y Carlos García-Serrano. 
06/04 La ley de Wagner: un análisis sintético. 
 Autor: Manuel Jaén García. 
07/04 La vivienda y la reforma fiscal de 1998: un ejercicio de simulación. 
 Autor: Miguel Ángel López García. 
08/04 Modelo dual de IRPF y equidad: un nuevo enfoque teórico y su aplicación al caso español. 
 Autor: Fidel Picos Sánchez. 
09/04 Public expenditure dynamics in Spain: a simplified model of its determinants. 
 Autores: Manuel Jaén García y Luis Palma Martos. 
10/04 Simulación sobre los hogares españoles de la reforma del IRPF de 2003. Efectos sobre 
la oferta laboral, recaudación, distribución y bienestar. 
 Autores: Juan Manuel Castañer Carrasco, Desiderio Romero Jordán y José Félix Sanz Sanz. 
11/04 Financiación de las Haciendas regionales españolas y experiencia comparada. 
 Autor: David Cantarero Prieto. 
12/04 Multidimensional indices of housing deprivation with application to Spain. 
 Autores: Luis Ayala y Carolina Navarro. 
13/04 Multiple ocurrence of welfare recipiency: determinants and policy implications. 
 Autores: Luis Ayala y Magdalena Rodríguez. 
14/04 Imposición efectiva sobre las rentas laborales en la reforma del impuesto sobre la renta 
personal (IRPF) de 2003 en España. 
 Autoras: María Pazos Morán y Teresa Pérez Barrasa. 
15/04 Factores determinantes de la distribución personal de la renta: un estudio empírico a 
partir del PHOGUE. 
 Autores: Marta Pascual y José María Sarabia. 
16/04 Política familiar, imposición efectiva e incentivos al trabajo en la reforma de la 
imposición sobre la renta personal (IRPF) de 2003 en España. 
 Autoras: María Pazos Morán y Teresa Pérez Barrasa. 
17/04 Efectos del déficit público: evidencia empírica mediante un modelo de panel dinámico 
para los países de la Unión Europea. 
 Autor: César Pérez López. 
 — 74 — 
18/04 Inequality, poverty and mobility: Choosing income or consumption as welfare 
indicators. 
 Autores: Carlos Gradín, Olga Cantó y Coral del Río. 
19/04 Tendencias internacionales en la financiación del gasto sanitario. 
 Autora: Rosa María Urbanos Garrido. 
20/04 El ejercicio de la capacidad normativa de las CCAA en los tributos cedidos: una 
primera evaluación a través de los tipos impositivos efectivos en el IRPF. 
 Autores: José María Durán y Alejandro Esteller. 
21/04 Explaining. budgetary indiscipline: evidence from spanish municipalities. 
 Autores: Ignacio Lago-Peñas y Santiago Lago-Peñas. 
22/04 Local governmets' asymmetric reactions to grants: looking for the reasons. 
 Autor: Santiago Lago-Peñas. 
23/04 Un pacto de estabilidad para el control del endeudamiento autonómico. 
 Autor: Roberto Fernández Llera 
24/04 Una medida de la calidad del producto de la atención primaria aplicable a los análisis 
DEA de eficiencia. 
 Autora: Mariola Pinillos García. 
25/04 Distribución de la renta, crecimiento y política fiscal. 
 Autor: Miguel Ángel Galindo Martín. 
26/04 Políticas de inspección óptimas y cumplimiento fiscal. 
 Autores: Inés Macho Stadler y David Pérez Castrillo. 
27/04 ¿Por qué ahorra la gente en planes de pensiones individuales? 
 Autores: Félix Domínguez Barrero y Julio López-Laborda. 
28/04 La reforma del Impuesto sobre Actividades Económicas: una valoración con 
microdatos de la ciudad de Zaragoza. 
 Autores: Julio López-Laborda, M.ª Carmen Trueba Cortés y Anabel Zárate Marco. 
29/04 Is an inequality-neutral flat tax reform really neutral? 
 Autores: Juan Prieto-Rodríguez, Juan Gabriel Rodríguez y Rafael Salas. 
30/04 El equilibrio presupuestario: las restricciones sobre el déficit. 
 Autora: Belén Fernández Castro. 
2005 
01/05 Efectividad de la política de cooperación en innovación: evidencia empírica española. 
 Autores:Joost Heijs, Liliana Herrera, Mikel Buesa, Javier Sáiz Briones y Patricia Valadez. 
02/05 A probabilistic nonparametric estimator. 
 Autores: Juan Gabriel Rodríguez y Rafael Salas. 
03/05 Efectos redistributivos del sistema de pensiones de la seguridad social y factores 
determinantes de la elección de la edad de jubilación. Un análisis por comunidades 
autónomas. 
 Autores: Alfonso Utrilla de la Hoz y Yolanda Ubago Martínez. 
14/05 La relación entre los niveles de precios y los niveles de renta y productividad en los países 
de la zona euro: implicaciones de la convergencia real sobre los diferenciales de inflación. 
 Autora: Ana R. Martínez Cañete. 
05/05 La Reforma de la Regulación en el contexto autonómico. 
 Autor: Jaime Vallés Giménez. 
 — 75 — 
06/05 Desigualdad y bienestar en la distribución intraterritorial de la renta, 1973-2000. 
 Autores: Luis Ayala Cañón, Antonio Jurado Málaga y Francisco Pedraja Chaparro. 
07/05 Precios inmobiliarios, renta y tipos de interés en España. 
 Autor: Miguel Ángel López García. 
08/05 Un análisis con microdatos de la normativa de control del endeudamiento local. 
 Autores: Jaime Vallés Giménez, Pedro Pascual Arzoz y Fermín Cabasés Hita. 
09/05 Macroeconomics effects of an indirect taxation reform under imperfect competition. 
 Autor: Ramón J. Torregrosa. 
10/05 Análisis de incidencia del gasto público en educación superior: nuevas aproximaciones. 
 Autora: María Gil Izquierdo. 
11/05 Feminización de la pobreza: un análisis dinámico. 
 Autora: María Martínez Izquierdo. 
12/05 Efectos del impuesto sobre las ventas minoristas de determinados hidrocarburos en la 
economía extremeña: un análisis mediante modelos de equilibrio general aplicado. 
 Autores: Francisco Javier de Miguel Vélez, Manuel Alejandro Cardenete Flores y Jesús 
Pérez Mayo. 
13/05 La tarifa lineal de Pareto en el contexto de la reforma del IRPF. 
 Autores: Luis José Imedio Olmedo, Encarnación Macarena Parrado Gallardo y María 
Dolores Sarrión Gavilán. 
14/05 Modelling tax decentralisation and regional growth. 
 Autores: Ramiro Gil-Serrate y Julio López-Laborda. 
15/05 Interactions inequality-polarization: characterization results. 
 Autores: Juan Prieto-Rodríguez, Juan Gabriel Rodríguez y Rafael Salas. 
16/05 Políticas de competencia impositiva y crecimiento: el caso irlandés. 
 Autores: Santiago Díaz de Sarralde, Carlos Garcimartín y Luis Rivas. 
17/05 Optimal provision of public inputs in a second-best scenario. 
 Autores: Diego Martínez López y A. Jesús Sánchez Fuentes. 
18/05 Nuevas estimaciones del pleno empleo de las regiones españolas. 
 Autores: Javier Capó Parrilla y Francisco Gómez García. 
19/05 US deficit sustainability revisited: a multiple structural change approach. 
 Autores: Óscar Bajo-Rubio. Carmen Díaz-Roldán y Vicente Esteve. 
20/05 Aproximación a los pesos de calidad de vida de los “Años de Vida Ajustados por 
Calidad” mediante el estado de salud autopercibido. 
 Autores: Anna García-Altés, Jaime Pinilla y Salvador Peiró. 
21/05 Redistribución y progresividad en el Impuesto sobre Sucesiones y Donaciones: una 
aplicación al caso de Aragón. 
 Autor: Miguel Ángel Barberán Lahuerta. 
22/05 Estimación de los rendimientos y la depreciación del capital humano para las regiones 
del sur de España. 
 Autora: Inés P. Murillo. 
23/05 El doble dividendo de la imposición ambiental. Una puesta al día. 
 Autor: Miguel Enrique Rodríguez Méndez. 
24/05 Testing for long-run purchasing power parity in the post bretton woods era: evidence 
from old and new tests. 
 Autor: Julián Ramajo Hernández y Montserrat Ferré Cariacedo. 
 — 76 — 
25/05 Análisis de los factores determinantes de las desigualdades internacionales en las 
emisiones de CO2 per cápita aplicando el enfoque distributivo: una metodología de 
descomposición por factores de Kaya. 
 Autores: Juan Antonio Duro Moreno y Emilio Padilla Rosa. 
26/05 Planificación fiscal con el impuesto dual sobre la renta. 
 Autores: Félix Domínguez Barrero y Julio López Laborda. 
27/05 El coste recaudatorio de las reducciones por aportaciones a planes de pensiones y las 
deducciones por inversión en vivienda en el IRPF 2002. 
 Autores: Carmen Marcos García, Alfredo Moreno Sáez, Teresa Pérez Barrasa y César 
Pérez López. 
28/05 La muestra de declarantes IEF-AEAT 2002 y la simulación de reformas fiscales: 
descripción y aplicación práctica. 
 Autores: Alfredo Moreno, Fidel Picos, Santiago Díaz de Sarralde, María Antiqueira y 
Lucía Torrejón. 
2006 
01/06 Capital gains taxation and progressivity. 
 Autor: Julio López Laborda. 
02/06 Pigou’s dividend versus Ramsey’s dividend in the double dividend literature. 
 Autores: Eduardo L. Giménez y Miguel Rodríguez. 
03/06 Assessing tax reforms. Critical comments and proposal: the level and distance effects. 
 Autores: Santiago Díaz de Sarralde Míguez y Jesús Ruiz-Huerta Carbonell. 
04/06 Incidencia y tipos efectivos del impuesto sobre el patrimonio e impuesto sobre 
sucesiones y donaciones. 
 Autora: Laura de Pablos Escobar. 
05/06 Descentralización fiscal y crecimiento económico en las regiones españolas. 
 Autores: Patricio Pérez González y David Cantarero Prieto. 
16/06 Efectos de la corrupción sobre la productividad: un estudio empírico para los países 
de la OCDE. 
 Autores: Javier Salinas Jiménez y M.ª del Mar Salinas Jiménez. 
07/06 Simulación de las implicaciones del equilibrio presupuestario sobre la política de 
inversión de las comunidades autónomas. 
 Autores: Jaime Vallés Giménez y Anabel Zárate Marco. 
18/06 The composition of public spending and the nationalization of party sistems in western 
Europe. 
 Autores: Ignacio Lago-Peñas y Santiago Lago.Peñas. 
09/06 Factores explicativos de la actividad reguladora de las Comunidades Autónomas 
(1989-2001). 
 Autores: Julio López Laborda y Jaime Vallés Giménez. 
10/06 Disciplina credititicia de las Comunidades Autónomas. 
 Autor: Roberto Fernández Llera. 
11/06 Are the tax mix and the fiscal pressure converging in the European Union?. 
 Autor: Francisco J. Delgado Rivero. 
12/06 Redistribución, inequidad vertical y horizontal en el impuesto sobre la renta de las 
personas físicas (1982-1998). 
 Autora: Irene Perrote. 
 — 77 — 
13/06 Análisis económico del rendimiento en la prueba de conocimientos y destrezas 
imprescindibles de la Comunidad de Madrid. 
 Autores: David Trillo del Pozo, Marta Pérez Garrido y José Marcos Crespo. 
14/06 Análisis de los procesos privatizadores de empresas públicas en el ámbito internacional. 
Motivaciones: moda política versus necesidad económica. 
 Autores: Almudena Guarnido Rueda, Manuel Jaén García e Ignacio Amate Fortes. 
15/06 Privatización y liberalización del sector telefónico español. 
 Autores: Almudena Guarnido Rueda, Manuel Jaén García e Ignacio Amate Fortes. 
16/06 Un análisis taxonómico de las políticas para PYME en Europa: objetivos, instrumentos 
y empresas beneficiarias. 
 Autor: Antonio Fonfría Mesa. 
17/06 Modelo de red de cooperación en los parques tecnológicos: un estudio comparado. 
 Autora: Beatriz González Vázquez. 
18/06 Explorando la demanda de carburantes de los hogares españoles: un análisis de 
sensibilidad. 
 Autores: Santiago Álvarez García, Marta Jorge García-Inés y Desiderio Romero Jordán. 
19/06 Cross-country income mobility comparisons under panel attrition: the relevance of 
weighting schemes. 
 Autores: Luis Ayala, Carolina Navarro y Mercedes Sastre. 
20/06 Financiación Autonómica: algunos escenarios de reforma de los espacios fiscales. 
 Autores: Ana Herrero Alcalde, Santiago Díaz de Sarralde, Javier Loscos Fernández, 
María Antiqueira y José Manuel Tránchez. 
21/06 Child nutrition and multiple equilibria in the human capital transition function. 
 Autores: Berta Rivera, Luis Currais y Paolo Rungo. 
22/06 Actitudes de los españoles hacia la hacienda pública. 
 Autor: José Luis Sáez Lozano. 
23/06 Progresividad y redistribución a través del IRPF español: un análisis de bienestar social 
para el periodo 1982-1998. 
 Autores: Jorge Onrubia Fernández, María del Carmen Rodado Ruiz, Santiago Díaz de 
Sarralde y César Pérez López. 
24/06 Análisis descriptivo del gasto sanitario español: evolución, desglose, comparativa 
internacional y relación con la renta. 
 Autor: Manuel García Goñi. 
25/06 El tratamiento de las fuentes de renta en el IRPF y su influencia en la desigualdad y la 
redistribución. 
 Autores: Luis Ayala Cañón, Jorge Onrubia Fernández y María del Carmen Rodado Ruiz. 
26/06 La reforma del IRPF de 2007: una evaluación de sus efectos. 
 Autores: Santiago Díaz de Sarralde Míguez, Fidel Picos Sánchez, Alfredo Moreno Sáez, 
Lucía Torrejón Sanz y María Antiqueira Pérez. 
27/06 Proyección del cuadro macroeconómico y de las cuentas de los sectores 
institucionales mediante un modelo de equilibrio. 
 Autores: Ana María Abad, Ángel Cuevas y Enrique M. Quilis. 
28/06 Análisis de la propuesta del tesoro Británico “Fiscal Stabilisation and EMU” y de sus 
implicaciones para la política económica en la Unión Europea. 
 Autor: Juan E. Castañeda Fernández. 
 — 78 — 
29/06 Choosing to be different (or not): personal income taxes at the subnational level in 
Canada and Spain. 
Autores: Violeta Ruiz Almendral y François Vaillancourt. 
30/06 A projection model of the contributory pension expenditure of the Spanish social 
security system: 2004-2050. 
Autores: Joan Gil, Miguel Ángel Lopez-García, Jorge Onrubia, Concepció Patxot y 
Guadalupe Souto. 
2007 
11/07 Efectos macroeconómicos de las políticas fiscales en la UE. 
 Autores: Oriol Roca Sagalés y Alfredo M. Pereira. 
02/07 Deficit sustainability and inflation in EMU: an analysis from the fiscal theory of the 
price level. 
 Autores: Óscar Bajo-Rubio, Carmen Díaz-Roldán y Vicente Esteve. 
03/07 Contraste empírico del modelo monetario de tipos de cambio: cointegración y ajuste 
no lineal. 
 Autor: Julián Ramajo Hernández. 
04/07 An empirical analysis of capital taxation: equity vs. tax compiance. 
 Autores: José M.a Durán Cabré y Alejandro Esteller Moré. 
05/07 Education and health in the OECD: a macroeconomic approach. 
 Autoras: Cecilia Albert y María A. Davia. 
06/07 Understanding the effect of education on health across European countries. 
 Autoras: Cecilia Albert y María A. Davia. 
07/07 Polarization, fractionalization and conflict. 
 Autores: Joan Esteban y Debraj Ray. 
08/07 Immigration in a segmented labor market: the effects on welfare. 
 Autor: Javier Vázquez Grenno. 
09/07 On the role of public debt in an OLG Model with endogenous labor supply. 
 Autor: Miguel Ángel López García. 
10/07 Assessing profitability in rice cultivation using the Policy Matrix Analysis and profit-
efficient data. 
 Autores: Andrés J. Picazo-Tadeo, Ernest Reig y Vicent Estruch. 
11/07 Equidad y redistribución en el Impuesto sobre Sucesiones y Donaciones: análisis de los 
efectos de las reformas autonómicas. 
 Autores: Miguel Ángel Barberán Lahuerta y Marta Melguizo Garde. 
12/07 Valoración y determinantes del stock de capital salud en la Comunidad Canaria y Cataluña. 
 Autores: Juan Oliva y Néboa Zozaya. 
13/07 La nivelación en el marco de la financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas. 
 Autores: Ana Herrero Alcalde y Jorge Martínez-Vázquez. 
14/07 El gasto en defensa en los países desarrollados: evolución y factores explicativos. 
 Autor: Antonio Fonfría Mesa. 
15/07 Los costes del servicio de abastecimiento de agua. Un análisis necesario para la 
regulación de precios. 
 Autores: Ramón Barberán Ortí, Alicia Costa Toda y Alfonso Alegre Val. 
16/07 Precios, impuestos y compras transfronterizas de carburantes. 
 Autores: Andrés Leal Marcos, Julio López Laborda y Fernando Rodrigo Sauco. 
 — 79 — 
17/07 Análisis de la distribución de las emisiones de CO2 a nivel internacional mediante la 
adaptación del concepto y las medidas de polarización. 
 Autores: Juan Antonio Duro Moreno y Emilio Padilla Rosa. 
18/07 Foreign direct investment and regional growth: an analysis of the Spanish case. 
 Autores: Óscar Bajo Rubio, Carmen Díaz Mora y Carmen Díaz Roldán. 
19/07 Convergence of fiscal pressure in the EU: a time series approach. 
 Autores: Francisco J. Delgado y María José Presno. 
20/07 Impuestos y protección medioambiental: preferencias y factores. 
 Autores: María de los Ángeles García Valiñas y Benno Torgler. 
21/07 Modelización paramétrica de la distribución personal de la renta en España. Una 
aproximación a partir de la distribución Beta generalizada de segunda especie. 
 Autores: Mercedes Prieto Alaiz y Carmelo García Pérez. 
22/07 Desigualdad y delincuencia: una aplicación para España. 
 Autores:Rafael Muñoz de Bustillo, Fernando Martín Mayoral y Pablo de Pedraza. 
23/07 Crecimiento económico, productividad y actividad normativa: el caso de las Comunidades 
Autónomas. 
 Autor: Jaime Vallés Giménez. 
24/07 Descentralización fiscal y tributación ambiental. El caso del agua en España. 
 Autores: Anabel Zárate Marco, Jaime Vallés Giménez y Carmen Trueba Cortés. 
25/07 Tributación ambiental en un contexto federal. Una aplicación empírica para los 
residuos industriales en España. 
 Autores: Anabel Zárate Marco, Jaime Vallés Giménez y Carmen Trueba Cortés. 
26/07 Permisos de maternidad, paternidad y parentales en Europa: algunos elementos para 
el análisis de la situación actual. 
 Autoras: Carmen Castro García y María Pazos Morán. 
27/07 ¿Quién soporta las cotizaciones sociales empresariales?. Una panorámica de la literatura 
empírica. 
 Autor: Ángel Melguizo Esteso. 
28/07 Una propuesta de financiación municipal. 
 Autores: Manuel Esteban Cabrera y José Sánchez Maldonado. 
29/07 Do R&D programs of different government levels overlap in the European Union. 
 Autoras: Isabel Busom y Andrea Fernández-Ribas. 
30/07 Proyecciones de tablas de mortalidad dinámicas de España y sus Comunidades 
Autónomas. 
 Autores: Javier Alonso Meseguer y Simón Sosvilla Rivero. 
2008 
11/08 Estudio descriptivo del voto económico en España. 
 Autores: José Luis Sáez Lozano y Antonio M. Jaime Castillo. 
12/08 The determinants of tax morale in comparative perspective: evidence from a multilevel 
analysis. 
 Autores: Ignacio Lago-Peñas y Santiago Lago-Peñas. 
13/08 Fiscal decentralization and the quality of government: evidence from panel data. 
 Autores: Andreas P. Kyriacou y Oriol Roca-Sagalés. 
14/08 The effects of multinationals on host economies: A CGE approach. 
 Autores: María C. Latorre, Oscar Bajo-Rubio y Antonio G. Gómez-Plana. 
 — 80 — 
15/08 Measuring the effect of spell recurrence on poverty dynamics. 
 Autores: José María Arranz y Olga Cantó. 
 
 
 
 
 
